FROM INTELLECTUALS TO DOXOSOPHERS: EDWARD SAID AND THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL

Dr. H. BAHADIR TÜRK
Assistant Professor
Çankaya University
Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences
Department of Political Science and International Relations
Ankara, Turkey

Abstract

It goes without saying that Edward W. Said is one of the most leading intellectual figures of the 20th century. Not only presenting a fruitful cultural critique of the modern Western world but also enabling us to ponder the gap between idealized, constructed and, in the final analysis, imaginary “East” and the real one, Said has had a particular impact on the field of humanities ranging from music to post-colonial studies, from cultural theory to literary theory. Due to his enormous intellectual efforts on this wide spectrum, this paper will not dare to present a par excellence intellectual portrait of Said himself. Instead, the primary aim of this paper is to focus on the transformation of the figure of intellectual by giving some primary references to the works of Said and particularly his monumental text “Representations of The Intellectual” (1993). This paper is simply to compare Said’s position as an intellectual, who is motivated by nothing but a genuine will to know -in Marx’s own words- “for a ruthless criticism of everything existing”, with the position of “television intellectuals” and the ones whom Pierre Bourdieu called “doxosophers”, that is to say, technicians of opinion. My central argument is that in contradiction to Said’s distinguished position, new intellectuals of times we’re living in has becoming more and more technicians of opinions, in other words, doxosophers.

Keywords: Edward Said, intellectual, Pierre Bourdieu, doxosopher, media, representation.

1. Introduction

I would like to begin with a story. According to the narrative of Abu Ubaid al-Juzjani (980-1037) who is Avicenna’s student, follower and biographer, Avicenna has great wisdom and depth of knowledge in almost all sciences, yet he has an ordeal to face. Despite all his efforts, Avicenna himself could not understand the core of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. He reads the book for 40 times and memorizes each and every line of the book, nonetheless he fails to make sense of the arguments embedded in the pages of Aristotle’s magnum opus. He cannot sleep at nights because he keeps thinking the purpose of Aristotle’s text . One day, drowning in despair and walking into the streets of the city he lives in, he suddenly sees an old salesman selling some old books. A book draws his attention immediately. That book written by Al-Farabi (also known as Alpharabius) is a sort of sacred sign from God to him and is entitled “On the Purpose of Aristotle’s Metaphysics”. Avicenna reads the book and fully understands Aristotle’s challenging arguments and the purpose of his book. Ubaid al-Juzjani writes that Avicenna then gives alms to beggars in the city in order to praise this beautiful coincidence and great intellectual joy (Badawi 1972, quoted in Arslan, 1996: ix).

I will dare to say that an intuitive knowledge of the definition of who intellectual is resides in this naïve story. This may be a fruitful starting point to ponder our burning question: Who is intellectual? An ascetic who has no material desire but a pure appetite for seeking the truth? A Don Quixote who fights windmills? A man of Renaissance who is in search of the will to know? A secular Jesus figure sacrifices himself for sins of modern human beings living in fear against the power of any authority? A virtuous spokesman of those who cannot speak for themselves? A lonely super-hero who suffers from the ungratefulness of the people? A merely political figure who represents any kind of opposition? An isolated individual having distinguished personal tastes in literature, cinema or music? A man of action who stands for the oppressed? A man of thought solely works in the realm of theory, in the kingdom of notions? An ivory-towered thinker who is apart from “ordinary people”? An adventurer having guts to oppose the socio cultural codes of his own society that he was born into?

1 “As Gutas remarks, Al-Farabi sharply criticizes those who confuse metaphysics with the Kalam and do not realize that the core of Aristotelian metaphysics is the general metaphysics.” See Druart, 1999: 156.
Or with a reference to Edward Said’s fruitful text, *Representations of The Intellectual*, an exile, a marginal or a stranger?

It goes without saying that Edward W. Said is one of the most leading intellectual figures of the 20th century. Not only presenting a fruitful cultural critique of the modern Western world but also enabling us to ponder the gap between idealized, constructed and, in the final analysis, imaginary “East” and the real one, Said has had a particular impact on the field of humanities ranging from music to post-colonial studies, from cultural theory to literary theory. Due to his enormous intellectual efforts on this wide spectrum, this paper will not dare to present a *par excellence* intellectual portrait of Said himself. Instead, the primary aim of this paper is to focus on the transformation of the figure of intellectual by giving some primary references to the works of Said and particularly his monumental text “Representations of The Intellectual” (1993). This paper is simply to compare Said’s position as an intellectual, who is motivated by nothing but a genuine will to know -in Marx’s own words- “for a ruthless criticism of everything existing”, with the position of “televisual intellectuals” and the ones whom Pierre Bourdieu called “doxosophers”, that is to say, “technicians of opinion who pose the problems of politics in the very same terms in which they are posed by businessmen, politicians and political journalists”.

My central argument is that in contradiction to Said’s distinguished position, new intellectuals of times we’re living in has becoming more and more technicians of opinions, that is to say, doxosophers. By comparing and contrasting the differences between the figure of intellectual and its new transformed, deformed mode of existence, doxosophers, I will try to examine the grounds of this transformation. In so doing, Said’s intellectual identity, his works reflecting this very identity and the problem of the future of intellectual will also be examined. Analyzing Said’s own insight on the issue, this paper will also shed light upon other “representations of the intellectual” through the conceptual lenses of Pierre Bourdieu. Throughout the paper, an interpretative-textual method will be employed. My discussion proceeds as follows. In the first part of the paper, I take a glance at some definitions and distinctions concerning the term intellectual. From Latin *intellectualis*, from *intellectus* the term intellectual refers to understanding/discrimination. Intellectual as a figure is the one who engaged in intellectual pursuits. Definitions of the term intellectual vary. For instance Talcott Parsons speaks of “the intellectual as a person who, though as a member of a society in the nature of the case he performs a complex of social roles, is in his principal role-capacity expected- an exception normally shared by himself- to put cultural considerations above social in defining the commitments by virtue of which his primary role and position are significant as contributions to valued outcomes of his action” (Parsons, 1969: 4). To him, it is obvious that the figure of intellectual is a byproduct of “the development of written language and a ‘philosophic breakthrough’”. The philosopher, the priest, the specialist in law can be considered as the early exemplars of the figure of intellectual.

It should be also added that the rising of the intellectuals in public sphere has gone hand in glove with the development of intellectual disciplines and universities. Aristocratic patronage affairs that kept the intellectuals alive have been replaced by the institutionalization of modern universities (Parsons, 1969: 5-17).

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2 As an example of Said’s multifaceted field of interest and work, Mitchell writes that “on the morning after Edward Said’s death” Homi Bhabha and he discussed and vacillated about to which aspect of Said’s works they could focus on. They swammed in a sea of questions and got drowned in revising the possibilities concerning if they should stress literary writing, or his musical criticism, or his role as a cultural theorist or his importance as a political commentator. See Mitchell, 2005:1.

3 See also Shills, 1969: 35-36
Within this process, the role of “the development of printing and the emergence of a large reading public” should also be underlined in making sense of the public visibility of the intellectuals as independent social actors (Shills, 1969: 34). After all these developments, when it comes to the nineteenth century, it is possible to mention new representations of intellectuals as “the inventor of ideology”, a celebrity known for his works, writings, public talks and so forth or simply Hegelian “beautiful soul”. As Said put it, “nineteenth-century representations of the intellectual tended to stress individuality; very often the intellectual is, like Turgenev’s Bazarov or James Joyce’s Stephen Dedalus, a solitary, somehow aloof figure, who does not confirm to society at all and is consequently a rebel completely outside established opinion” (Said, 1994: 51).

In the twentieth century, as Shills noted, there has been an ongoing process of the “diversity and specialization of intellectuals” which “raises a question the extent to which they form a community, bound together by a sense of mutual affinity, by attachment to a common set of rules and common identifying symbols” (Shills, 1969: 38). For Chomsky, “with a positive connotation”, the figure of intellectual refers to “whoever it is who's thinking about things, trying to understand things, trying to work things out, maybe trying to articulate and express that understanding to others and so on.” (Chomsky, 2005: 7). Ralf Dahrendorf compares the position of the intellectuals in the modern society to that of the fools. In Dahrendorf’s words, “the power of the fool lies in the freedom with respect to the hierarchy of the special order, that is, he speaks from outside as well as from inside it. The fool belongs to the social order and yet he does not commit himself to it; he can without fear even speak uncomfortable truths about it” (Dahrendorf, 1969: 50). To think in terms of Said, daring to “speak the truth to power”, fools have a privileged positioning. The fool is the mediator neither standing above nor standing below.

Hence, his locus is difficult to be pinpointed. For Dahrendorf, “the fools of modern society (...) are the intellectuals” and “as the court jesters of modern society, all intellectuals have the duty to doubt everything that is obvious, to make relative all authority, to ask all those questions that no one else dares to ask” (Dahrendorf, 1969: 51). What about the peculiarities of the figure of intellectual? What is the hallmark of the intellectuals? What are the distinguishing characteristics that define them? Let us take the example of Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci begins his discussion with a simple but quite critical question: “Are intellectuals an autonomous and independent social group or does every social group have its own particular specialized category of intellectuals?” (Gramsci, 1971: 5). Similarly Said echoes Gramsci by going into the debate on intellectuals in his book, Representations of The Intellectual, by asking: “Are intellectuals a very large or an extremely small and highly selective group of people?” (Said, 1994: 3).

Gramsci points out that even though all men are intellectuals in a general sense of the word, since they have by nature a capability of using their intellect and besides “in any physical work, even the most degraded and mechanical, there exists a minimum of technical qualification, that is a minimum of creative intellectual activity” (Gramsci, 1971: 8). However, approaching the issue from the point of social functioning, it is not possible to claim that all men in society fulfill the role of intellectuals. As is understood, through the lenses of Gramsci, intellectuals have a social role. From this perspective, intellectuals for Gramsci are divided into two major groups. On the one hand, there are organic intellectuals “which every class creates alongside itself and elaborates in the course of its development, are for the most part “specializations” of partial aspects of the primitive activity of the new social type which the new class has brought into prominence.” (Gramsci, 1971: 6) and on the other hand, there are traditional intellectuals “to represent an historical continuity uninterrupted even by the most complicated and radical changes in political and social forms” (Gramsci, 1971: 7). As Gramsci also noted, clergy which -in its origin- is linked to aristocracy is a perfect example of traditional intellectuals and “what marks these groups of intellectuals traditional is the fact that they belong to a different historical time from the organic intellectuals created by the new class.” (Sassoon, 1980: 142). It should be also noted that Gramsci makes another distinction between urban and rural-type intellectuals.

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4 For the historical quest of the term intellectual, one should mention the role of the Dreyfus Affair. “Benda was spiritually shaped by the Dreyfus Affair and World War One, both of them rigorous tests for intellectuals, who could either choose to speak up courageously against an act of anti-Semitic military injustice and nationalist fervor, or sheepishly go along with the herd, refusing to defend the unfairly condemned Jewish officer Alfred Dreyfus, chanting jingoist slogans in order to stir up war fever against everything German” (Said, 1994: 6).

5 Dahrendorf also holds that “whether a society includes intellectual court jesters who critically question its institutions, and how it tolerates them are, a measure of its maturity and inner solidity” (Dahrendorf, 1969: 52).
He simply puts that “intellectuals of the rural type are for the most part ‘traditional’, that is they are linked to the social mass of country people and the town petite bourgeoisie, not as yet elaborated and set in motion by the capitalist system” (Gramsci, 1971: 14). When it comes to intellectuals of the urban type whose primary function is “to articulate the relationship between the entrepreneur and the instrumental mass” (Gramsci, 1971: 14), one may articulate that this group of intellectuals is part and parcel of the growth of industrial capitalism.

Foucault (Foucault, 1980: 126-128) makes a distinction between universal intellectual of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and specific intellectual of today. For him universal intellectuals -“as the spokesman of universal” and “the conscious/atmosphere/of us all”- “par excellence used to be the writer, as a universal consciousness, a free subject, (...)” counterposed to those intellectuals who were merely competent instances in the service of the State or Capital—technicians, magistrates, teachers". Universal intellectual for Foucault represents “the man of justice, the man of law, who counterposes to power, despotism” and therefore it is possible to advance that this figure “derived from the jurist and notable”. Specific intellectual, on the other hand, can be seen as the byproduct of specific historical conditions. That “each individual’s specific activity began to serve as the basis for politicization, the threshold of writing, as the sacralising mark of the intellectual, has disappeared” and “it has become possible to develop lateral connections across different forms of knowledge” has opened up the possibility of the emergence of an intellectual of a new kind, namely specific intellectual being visible “within specific sectors, at the precise points where their own conditions of life and work situate them (housing, the hospital, the asylum, the laboratory, the university, family and sexual relations)” and “has emerged since the Second World War. Whereas universal intellectual is, albeit in a much more abstract form, a form of jurist, what Foucault called specific intellectual can be thought as a form of “the savant or expert”.

Foucault warns us about not to fall into trap of discounting specific intellectual politically “in his specific relation to a local form of power”. Even though it is true that specific intellectuals “serve the interests of the State or Capital”, this trait enables them a very strategic position which can be benefited in any struggle against the authority. It would be also an error to think “the question of the professionalization of intellectuals” in terms of “science or ideology”. What is to be done is to ponder the very relationship between the positioning of intellectuals and the new professionalization process through the “truth” and “power. The task of specific intellectuals has no more to do with the “changing people’s consciousness” but to change the regime of truth (Foucault, 1980: 131-132). As Foucault pointed out, universal intellectual “spoke the truth to those who had yet to see it, in the name of those who were forbidden to speak the truth: he was conscience, consciousness, and eloquence”. Today, on the other hand, “the intellectual’s role is no longer to place himself “somewhat ahead and to the side” in order to express the stifled truth of the collectivity; rather, it is to struggle against the forms of power that transform him into its object and instrument in the sphere of “knowledge,” “truth,” “consciousness,” and “discourse. (Foucault and Deleuze, 1972).


What about Said? What is his insight on the issue? How does he coin the term? I think it would be meaningful to call for his text, Representations of the Intellectual, and list some characteristics that he attached to the figure of intellectual. At first sight, it should be pinpointed that according to Said, “the intellectual is an individual with a specific public role in society that cannot be reduced simply to being a faceless professional, a competent member of a class just going about her/his business. (...) The intellectual is an individual endowed with a faculty for representing, embodying, articulating a message, a view, an attitude, philosophy or opinion to, as well as for, a public.” (Said, 1994: 9). Secondly, to him, “there is no such thing as private intellectual, since the movement you set down the words and then publish them you have entered the public world. Nor is there only public intellectual. (…) There is always the personal infection and the private sensibility, and those give meaning to what is being said or written.” (Said, 1994: 9). Thirdly, as Said emphasized, “real intellectuals, (…), are supposed to risk being burned at stake, ostracized or crucified.” (Said, 1994: 5). Fourthly, Said strongly emphasizes that “the intellectual always stands between loneliness and alignment” (Said, 1994: 16). In the fifth place, it should be articulated that from Said’s perspective, “the intellectual always has a choice either to side with the weaker, the less well-represented, the forgotten or ignored, or to side with the more powerful” (Said, 1994: 24).

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6 In order to make sense of Said’s position as an intellectual through a debate on social sciences, universities and capitalism, see Göker’s insightful analysis referring to the connection between the thought of Said and that of Bourdieu. (Göker, 2003-2004: 6-23).
The peculiarities of intellectuals according to Said can also be listed as follows:


b. “Uncompromising freedom of opinion and expression is the secular intellectual’s main bastion” (Said, 1994: 66).

c. “It is scarcely serious to hold up the individual intellectual as a perfect ideal, a sort of shining knight who is so pure and so noble as to deflect any suspicion of material interest. No one can pass such a test, not even Joyce’s Stephen Dedalus.” (Said, 1994: 52).

d. “The intellectual does not represent a statue-like icon, but an individual vocation, an energy, a stubborn force engaging as a committed and recognizable voice in language and in society with a whole slew of issues, all of them having to do in the end with a combination of enlightenment and emancipation or freedom.” (Said, 1994: 55).


f. “True intellectual is a secular being” (Said, 1994: 89).

Within this framework, Said’s central argument is that “intellectuals are individuals with a vocation for the art of representing, whether that is talking, writing, teaching, appearing on television.” (Said, 1994: 10). Said makes a critical distinction between intellectuals as outsiders and intellectuals as insiders. “Those on the one hand who belong on the one hand fully to the society as it is, who flourish in it without an overwhelming sense of dissonance or dissent, those can be called yea-sayers; and on the other hand, the nay-sayers, the individuals at odds with their society and therefore outsiders and exiles so far as privileges, power and honors are concerned” (Said, 1994: 39). In order to make sense of Said’s conceptualization of intellectual, the notion of exile should be kept in mind. In his words, “exile for the intellectual in this metaphysical sense is restlessness, movement, constantly being unsettled and unsettling the others” (Said, 1994: 39) and “exile means that you are always going to be marginal, and that what you do as an intellectual has to be made up because you cannot follow a prescribed path”. (Said, 1994: 46). The tragedy of exile for Said has nothing to do with living far from home. Rather it is the murk of living within the imperative signs of the old good times. To put it in his own terms, “the fact is that for most exiles the difficulty consists not simply in being forced to live away from home, but rather given today’s world, in living with the many reminders that you are in exile, that your home is not in fact so far away” (Said, 1994: 36). Hence, “the intellectual as exile tends to be happy with the idea of unhappiness.” (Said, 1994: 39). Based on this conceptual framework, Said’s notion of intellectual refers to a figure whose role is “to challenge and defeat both an imposed silence and the normalized quiet of unseen power wherever and whenever possible” (Said, 2003: 135).

4. A Debate on Doxosophers

Edwars Shills asserts that “intellectuals are indispensable to any society, and the more complex the society, the more indispensable they are” (Shills, 1969: 47). I think, we all agree with the fact that the complexity is a par excellence characteristic that can define our age and societal networks in which we fulfill ourselves. For that reason, my naïve argument refers to the fact that we are living in times that make beclouds the possibility to trace the figure of intellectuals. Who is entitled to be called intellectual? To discuss “the now and then” of the intellectuals, I will claim that what is to be done at the first level is to ponder Frank Furedi’s question: “Where have all the intellectuals gone?” What happened to old figure of intellectual? If there are some vicissitudes about the intellectuals, in which ground can it be possible to grasp this kind of process of change? What is the source of that kind of shift? To start my inquiry about the transformation of the figure of intellectual, I will dare to hold that the story about the change of the figure of intellectual can be read as a story of evolution. My argument is that today, even though there exist genuine intellectuals having virtue and -in the Platonic sense of the word- wisdom, the figure of intellectual has become a specialist what Pierre Bourdieu called doxosopher. I will also advance that uneasiness about the transformation of the intellectuals is a commonality between the thought of Edward Said and that of Pierre Bourdieu. Referring to Gramscian notion of organic intellectual, Said asserts that “today’s advertising or or public relations expert, who devises techniques for winning a detergent or airline company a larger share of the market, would be considered an organic intellectual according to Gramscil” (Said, 1994: 4).

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7 Said also puts that “The intellectual in exile is necessarily ironic, skeptical, even playful-but not cynical” (Said, 1994: 45). It should be remembered that “A cynic, Oscar Wilde says, is someone who knows the price of everything but the value of nothing.” (Said, 1994: 51).
Can there be anything such as fully independent intellectual? Seeking to reply to that kind of question, Said puts that “one who is not beholden to, and therefore constrained, by his or her affiliations with universities that pay salaries, political parties that demand loyalty to a party line, think tanks that while they offer freedom to do research perhaps more subtly compromise judgment and restrain the critical voice.” (Said, 1994: 51). At this point, the term professionalism is worth pondering and for Said, it is the major threat to intellectual ideals and the figure of intellectual. In other words, what puts the future of intellectual being capable of speaking the truth to power at risk is an understanding of professionalism. In his words, “the particular threat to the intellectual today, whether in the West or non-Western world, is not the academy nor the suburbs, nor the appalling commercialism of journalism and publishing houses, but rather an attitude that I will call professionalism. By professionalism I mean thinking of your work as an intellectual as something you do for a living” (Said, 1994: 55).

This professionalism is all about “making yourself marketable and above all presentable, hence uncontroversial and unpolitical and ‘objective’ ” (Said, 1994: 55). Said believes that “specialization”, “expertise and the cult of the certified expert”, “the drift towards power and authority in its adherents, towards the requirements and prerogatives of power, and towards being directly employed by it” (Said, 1994: 57-59) are main pressures that challenge the identity of intellectuals. It should be noted that “amateurism” for Said may be a cure for the disease of that kind of professionalism. According to him, amateurism has to with “the desire to be moved not by profit or reward but by love for and unquenchable interest in the larger picture, in making connections across lines and barriers, in refusing to be tied down to a specialty, in caring for ideas and values despite the restrictions of a profession.” (Said, 1994: 57). He portrays the state of mind of the modern intellectual in an outstanding way:

> You do not want to appear to political: you are afraid of seeming controversial; you need the approval of a boss or an authority figure; you want to keep a reputation for being balanced, objective, moderate; your hope is to be asked back, to consult, to be on a board or prestigious committee, and so to remain within the responsible mainstream; someday you hope to get an honorary degree, a big prize, perhaps even an ambassadorship. For an intellectual these habits of mind are corrupting par excellence. If anything can denature, neutralize, and finally kill a passionate intellectual life it is the internalization of such habits. (Said, 1994: 74).

Through these materialized, pseudo concerns, professionalism functions as an invisible barrier for, in Chomsky’s words, “honest intellectuals”. Chomsky emphasizes that “honest intellectuals’ are usually outside the system, for good reasons. There is no reason to expect institutions of power and domination to tolerate people trying to undermine them. Quite the opposite. So therefore you quite typically find the honest and serious intellectuals, people who are committed to, (…), enlightenment values, values of truth, freedom, liberty, and justice, there would be major efforts made to marginalize them” (Chomsky, 2005: 21).

Bourdieu’s account for the new professional intellectual figure can be evaluated through the same vein:

> The intellectual world is now the site of a struggle aimed at producing and imposing ‘new intellectuals’ and therefore a new definition of the intellectual and the intellectual’s political role, a new definition of philosophy and the philosopher, henceforward engaged in the vague debates of a political philosophy without technical content, a social science reduced to journalistic commentary for election nights, and uncritical glossing of unscientific opinion polls. Plato had a wonderful word for all these people: doxosophers. These ‘technicians of opinion who think themselves wise’ (I’m translating the triple meaning of the word) pose the problems of politics in the very same terms in which they are posed by businessmen, politicians and political journalists (in other words the very people who can afford to commission surveys…) (Bourdieu, 1992).

It would not be a naïve deduction to conclude that for Bourdieu the primary task for an intellectual is to have the ability of knowing “how to listen and to interpret what is said to them” without being gravitated by their “usual egoism and narcissism” (Grass and Bourdieu, 2002: 68)

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According to Bourdieu; “Sociologists are in a very particular position. They are unlike other intellectuals, since most of them know in general how to listen and to interpret what is said to them, to transcribe and transmit it. Perhaps this makes them sound too much like a guild; but I think it would be good if intellectuals, indeed all those with the time to think and write, were to take part in this kind of work—which presupposes an ability, all too rare among intellectuals, to shed their
Echoing Said’s attempt to advocate the “amateur intellectuals”, Bourdieu tries to “the possibility and the necessity of the critical intellectual, who is firstly critical of the intellectual doxa secreted by the doxosophers.” (Bourdieu, 1992). The transformation from intellectuals to professionals, from intellectuals to doxosophers arises from socio-economic dynamics of Debordian “society of spectacle” and the rising of new media culture. In modern times, being visible does what really matter.

My claim is that for intellectuals the functioning of this process is twofold. First, media networks benefits from all ideological gimmicks to cover the real problems and tend to exclude the intellectuals what Chomsky called honest and Said called amateurs. They employ retired military officers as expert strategists, academicians as the unquestionable authorities on several issues from economics to politics and eminent columnists who share their views with the public. Second, let’s say, even if there is a room for a TV programme including real opponent intellectuals, programme guide or timing of the programme has not been designed in favour of intellectuals. Bourdieu calls attention to this very point and states that “writers and thinkers today have been entirely dispossessed of the means of production and transmission; they no longer have any control over them, and must make their point in short programmes, by all manner of tricks and subterfuges. Our conversation can only be shown at 11 pm on a restricted access channel aimed at intellectuals. If we tried to say what we are saying now on a large public channel, we would—as you point out—be immediately interrupted by the presenter: in effect, censored.” (Grass and Bourdieu, 2002: 69-70). This strategy in media brings forth the necessity to rethink Bourdieu’s concept of doxa.

Doxa, in Bourdieu’s words, “is the relationship of immediate adherence that is established in practice between a habitus and the field to which it is attuned, the pre-verbal taking- for-granted of the world that flows from practical sense.” (Bourdieu, 1990: 68). Doxa thus implies a practical knowledge and by using doxa “we accept many things without knowing them and that is what is called ideology” (Bourdieu, 1997: 268). Doxa is a particular point of view, “the point of view of the dominant which presents and imposes itself as a universal point of view -the point of view of those who dominate by dominating the State and who have constituted their point of view as universal by constituting the State.” (Bourdieu, 1998: 57). As Eagleton argued, “doxa belongs to a tradition-bound social order in which power is fully naturalized and unquestionable, so that no social arrangement different from the present could even be imagined. Here, subject and object merge indistinguishably into each other.” (Eagleton, 1991: 157). As Krars pointed out, “every mode of domination, even if it uses physical violence, presupposes a doxic order shared by the dominated and the dominants.” (Krars, 1990: 169). Doxophers reproduce the given framework of images and opinions. They reconstitute the ground in which meaning is produced. They does not question authority but reaffirms it with its all dimensions. To make the position of doxosophers crystal clear, to see what Pierre Bourdieu mentions about the issue might be fruitful again (Bourdieu, 1992):

There is no genuine democracy without genuine opposing critical powers. The intellectual is one of those, of the first magnitude. That is why I think that the work of demolishing the critical intellectual, living or dead – Marx, Nietzsche, Sartre, Foucault, and some others who are grouped together under the label Pensée 68 – is as dangerous as the demolition of the public interest and that it is part of the same process of restoration. Of course I would prefer it if intellectuals had all, and always, lived up to the immense historical responsibility they bear and if they had always invested in their actions not only their moral authority but also their intellectual competence – like, to cite just one example, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, who has engaged all his mastery of historical method in a critique of the abuses of history.

usual egoism and narcissism.” See Grass and Bourdieu, 2002: 68. He also clearly emphasizes that “the sociologist is opposed to the doxosopher, like the philosopher, in that she questions the things that are self-evident, in particular those that present themselves in the form of questions, her own as much as other people’s. This profoundly shocks the doxosopher, who sees a political bias in the refusal to grant the profoundly political submission implied in the unconscious acceptance of commonplaces, in Aristotle’s sense – notions or theses with which people argue, hut over which they do not argue.” See Bourdieu, 1992. However, it should also be noted that Bourdieu’s criticisms about doxosophers does not exclude sociologists as a par excellence representatives of critical intellectuals. Even among sociologists there exist the one showing doxosophistic inclinations. As Sterne puts it, “Pierre Bourdieu was fond of criticizing sociologists’ willingness to take up problems defined in advance in the fields of professional politics (the ‘field of power’), journalism or education as if those problems were of transcendent intellectual interest or significance” See Sterne, 2003: 369.
Having said that, in the words of Karl Kraus, ‘between two evils, I refuse to choose the lesser.’ While I have little indulgence for ‘irresponsible’ intellectuals, I have even less respect for the ‘intellectuals’ of the political-administrative establishment, polymorphous polygraphs who polish their annual essays between two meetings of boards of directors, three publishers’ parties and miscellaneous television appearances.

To be more precise, Said’s reference to a bunch of professionals can be thought on this axis. He articulates that “there is a whole group of these people, numbering thirty or forty, who are trundled out whenever there’s a crisis, a hostage crisis, a hijacking, a massacre of some sort or another, to demonstrate the necessary connection between Islam, Arab culture and the Arab character, as it’s sometimes referred to, or the Islamic character, and random violence” (Said, 1994b: 28). Whereas doxa creates its own doxosphers through habituses, practices, fields, the characteristic of the new professionals/doxosphers has become the loss of perspective. And in Said’s words, “loss of perspective, especially among the intellectuals, has been the worst thing. The seductions of power. The delights of authority. The absence of dialogue. That, in theory, is what intellectuals should refute” (Said, 1994b: 141).

Nonetheless, there is no room for pessimism in Said’s thought. For instance, despite the tragic failure of the American left in taking sides about real problems, according to Said, “there still are a number of public intellectuals, (...) like Chomsky and a few others who still persist in trying to tell the truth. But the public realm is also full of tokenized intellectuals who had been once perhaps symbols of resistance and principle and have now become media figures and stars of the lecture platform” (Said, 1994b: 168) and he talks about “the emancipator potential” of the new conditions by referring to the emergence of new communication platforms for the benefit of the “mobile intellectual energy” (Said, 2003: 132). Echoing Said again, Bourdieu himself underlines the possibility of resistance derived from a “sociological imagination” as well. In order to grasp what is at stake within the transformation of intellectuals is the critical imagination itself, one should rethink and analyze the existing order. Maybe the problem for the figure of intellectual is not deriving from merely authoritarian regimes, but also from the dynamics of modern liberal society. As Said stressed, “in spending a lot of time worrying about the restrictions on thought and intellectual freedom under totalitarian systems of government we have not been as fastidious in considering threats to the individual intellectual system that rewards intellectual conformity, as well as willing participation in goals that have been set not by science but by the government” (Said, 1994: 61).

5. Conclusion

Georgi M. Derluguian’s extraordinary beautiful book titled “Bourdieu’s Secret Admirer in the Caucasus” tells the story of Musa Shanib, “a fearsome Circassian rebel in the North Caucasus, whose lieutenants once included the even more fearsome Chechen fighters Shamil Basayev and Ruslan Gelayev” (Derluguian, 2005: 1-2). Love of knowledge has no boundaries. Pleasures of thinking have no countries. Each country’s, each historical period has its own particular intellectuals, yes. But what I would like to say here is that intellectual is an universal figure. Therefore, the crisis of intellectuals is universal. Differentiation of media channels can generate new mediums for new “honest intellectuals” but on the other hand dominant media apparatuses seem to continue the general socio-political trends. Even not pessimistic, cautiously optimistic attitude I have towards this picture. Daring to sound to be ridiculously naïve, I will advance that if there would be one and only peculiarity that saves the soul of genuine intellectuals and prevents them from becoming doxosphers, that is the element of courage.

Today the problem is simple for us, who live in the limbo of intellectual life. Are we courageous enough to abandon our conformist lives? Are we courageous enough to jeopardize our privileged positions? Remember what Eqbal Ahmad said about Said, “since the publication of Orientalism (1978) the word ‘courageous’ has been used often to describe his writings” (Ahmad, 1994: 8). I have begun with a story and would like to conclude it with another one. One day a mysterious man comes to a village and claims that he is a prophet, the chosen one. People in the village do not believe him and ask him to prove his claim. The mysterious man shows the wall surrounding the village and yells: “Would you believe me if these walls could speak out and say that I am a prophet?” “Yes we definitely would” villagers reply with one voice.

9 As a good example for his courage Ahmad states that even though FBI had warned Said to be careful against the possible threats that might originate from some violent groups, he has continued his intellectual and political activities (for instance “his advocacy for the liberation of Palestine). For this anecdote and other examples see Ahmad, 1994: 8-9. At this point it also would be fruitful to remember Said’s own assessment, “I’m on half a dozen death lists in the Middle East” (Said, 1994b: 58).
Then the man claiming that he himself is a prophet points his finger toward the wall and orders: “Let the wall speak up!” With that command, the wall starts to speak with a voice reminiscent of thunder blast and says: “He is not a prophet. He is fooling you. Do not believe him. He is not a prophet…” The times intellectuals have been seen as the prophets, the chosen ones, the men of truth is over.10 Daring to extend the limits of the metaphor, it can be said that today’s so-called intellectuals correspond to false prophets. What we need is a wall that can speak the truth to people, a wall that won’t fall down. A wall made of the stones of courage. To underline once again, courage is what distinguishes an intellectual from a par excellence professional, in other words, doxosophers. We tend to think the person that we know through a series of scenes, pictures, images. For many of us, I think, while remembering Said the most striking and memorable scene is the very image of him throwing a stone across the Lebanon-Israel border.

The litmus test about the existing position of the intellectuals might be such kind of question: How many intellectuals who have the courage to do that kind of thing do we know in our academic or intellectual “neighborhood”? Yet, if the existing conditions and dynamics of the transformation of the figure of intellectual are considered and analyzed in an elaborate way, I suppose it would not be a merely wishful thinking that for the future of intellectuals. Maybe the first thing to be done is to have the courage to trace the vicissitudes of the figure of intellectuals. Even though this kind of task seems too fuzzy to be dealt with, too depressing to be hopeful of the future of intellectuals, nevertheless, we should remember that like all real intellectual activity, the joy of thinking resides with this task. We should not allow the gloomy outlook to depress us. It should be remembered that critical thinking can go hand in hand with humor. As Edward Said put it “intellectuals are not required to be humorless complainers” (Said, 1994: xv).

References
Arslan A. (1996) “Çevirenin Önsözü”, in Aristoteles, Metafizik, translated by A. Arslan, İstanbul: Sosyal Yayınları,

10 However, I agree with Said’s account concerning the fact that “many people still feel the need to look at the writer-intellectual as someone who ought be listened to as a guide to the confusing present, and as a leader of faction, tendency or group vying for more power and influence” (Said, 2003: 121). But what I would like to emphasize is that this need is abused, exploited and manipulated by doxosophers and the very socio political environment that generates doxosophers.


