The Distinction of Appearances and Things in Themselves: How Crucial Is It for Kant’s Critical Philosophy?

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Abstract
Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in themselves has been a debate of discussion in philosophy studies. The present study explores Kant’s key philosophical discussions as reflected in his major work The Critique of Pure Reason. The main aim of the paper is to discuss the cruciality of the distinction of appearances and things in themselves in Kant’s critical philosophy. What led Kant to the claim of a distinction between appearances and things in themselves, how the objects of knowledge are distinguished and the results that would come out without this distinction are taken into consideration.

Keywords: Kant’s critical philosophy, things in themselves.

Introduction
The immense interest in the concept of a thing in itself cannot be ignored in Kantian philosophy. The notion has been considered by many philosophers and interpreters in different ways and was a main topic of debate. Shaw claims that the concept of a thing in itself distinguishes Kantians, non-Kantians and different views among neo-Kantians. Reinhold and post-Kantian German idealism rejected the thing in itself because something that is foreign to the nature of thought is not cognizable in knowledge. The neo-Kantian schools adopted the views of Hegel and Schelling and rejected the thing in itself in ontological level. Jacobi remarked that without the thing in itself, one can not become a Kantian. However, with the thing in itself, it’s not possible to stay Kantian. (Hoaglund, 1973)

In the Preface to B Edition of The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant approaches the problem of reason from a perspective through which he questions whether metaphysics can be led to the “secure path of science”. The model Kant uses for comparison is logic, namely Aristotelian syllogism, which owes its completeness and certainty to the abstraction of thought from the content. The hope for the possibility of metaphysics’ having such certainty arises from the example of natural sciences, the methodologies of which have been changed by “one sudden revolution.” For the realization of metaphysical knowledge, it has to share some characteristics with logic. All scientific knowledge must be based on a unified system of formal rules of thought. However, it is clear that metaphysics is different from logic in that it has content and is the science of reality.

Kant makes a distinction between theoretical and practical reason which asserts that we may know objects in two ways. Theoretical reason is used when claims are made about the properties of things that exist independently of us. By theoretical reason we determine the object and its concept. The examples Kant uses for this are Mathematics and Physics which determine their objects a priori. Contrarily, practical reason is involved in such a process in which objective states of affairs are brought into existence. Practical reason makes value judgments and accepts imperatives and applies all these to concrete situations. Thus, the object of the judgment does not exist prior to the judgment. The Critique of Pure Reason can be approached as Kant’s account of metaphysical foundations of theoretical reasoning.
The aim of the present paper is to explore what necessity the distinction of appearances and things in themselves has in Kant’s critical philosophy. The reasons that make such a distinction crucial for Kant are discussed relation to different aspects of transcendental philosophy. Initially, what led Kant to the claim of a distinction between appearances and things in themselves, how the objects of knowledge are distinguished and the results that would come out without this distinction are taken into consideration. Secondly, why things in themselves are not known to us and the relation of unknowability thesis to Kant’s transcendental idealism are explained. Thirdly, non-spatiotemporality of things in themselves is proposed. The argument that space and time as forms of intuition introduced by Kant in Aesthetic are not considered as features of things in themselves is addressed. In the final discussion section the question whether appearances and things in themselves are two separate objects or not is resolved.

The Distinction: Appearances and Things in Themselves

The essential role of this distinction in Kantian philosophy can be observed in Allison’s claims that comprehension of Kant’s idealism depends on the way we interpret the transcendental distinction between appearances and things in themselves. (cited in Robinson, 1994) Bird recognizes the distinction as a technical contrast between appearances that are bound to sense experience and things in themselves that are supposed to be independent of experience. For Bird a role of this distinction is to “separate what reason can and can not legitimately do.” (2006, p. 5)

Kant’s critical method may be identified as “Copernican Revolution” for rejecting a traditional assumption about knowledge. The traditional assumption that “our knowledge must conform to its objects” has prevented us from establishing a priori things about objects through concepts and enlarging our knowledge of them. (Bxvi, xvii) This assumption bases knowledge on subject-independent truth and does not let us establish the validity of a priori or necessary knowledge. Kant believes that in order to succeed in metaphysical tasks, such a tradition ought to be reversed. A diverse assumption that “the objects must conform to our knowledge” will make way for the possibility of a priori knowledge about objects. (Bxvi, xvii) This in turn will provide us with knowledge of objects before they are given to us in experience.

Kant feels the need for a new claim about metaphysics similar to what Copernicus made for astronomy. A similar experiment can be done in metaphysics about the intuition of objects. If we propose that “intuition must conform to the constitution of objects” we support that we can not have a priori knowledge about them. (Bxvi, xvii) But the possibility of a priori knowledge will occur if we assert that “the object conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition.” (Bxvi, xvii) Kant describes his new method of thought as “we know things a priori only that which we ourselves put into them.” (Bxiii)

This switch realized by Kant’s Copernican Revolution requires two ways of examining object of knowledge. If an object of knowledge is considered as a thing in itself that is independent of subject, it is not possible to make any adjustments of object to subject. If the object of knowledge is regarded as an appearance, the conditions that the object must meet in order to appear to us can be drawn out from the subject’s cognitive faculties. Such knowledge is synthetic a priori and this is what makes metaphysics possible according to Kant. (Robinson, 1994) Cassirer emphasizes that the thought of the thing in itself is a necessary thought, but till it limits the experience. Hartmann comments on the possibility of limitation of the thought of the thing in itself by expressing that the boundaries are put for the knowledge of the object, not for the object which is independent of its being known. (cited in Malter, 1981)

Kant also discusses where this new experiment would be successful. In its first part, metaphysics is about the view that the objects that are given in experience have corresponding a priori concepts, which is the secure course of a science. This can explicitly be explained by the change in assumption that we have previously mentioned. But our faculty of knowing a priori damages the second part of metaphysics. Kant describes how the second purpose of metaphysics been damaged as “the impossibility of using this faculty to transcend the limits of possible experience, which is precisely the most essential concern of the science of metaphysics”. (Bxx, xxi) A priori rational knowledge is only about the appearances and leaves the thing in itself as a reality in itself but something unknown to us. What directs us to go beyond the limits of experience is the “unconditioned” and the reason necessarily demands the unconditioned.
Metaphysics analyses pure a priori knowledge in which it distinguishes two heterogeneous elements. One element is the knowledge of appearances and the other one is the knowledge of things in themselves. It is dialectic that combines these two elements in harmony by the help of the reason’s necessary idea of the unconditioned. Burnham (2007) deals with the notion of objects of experience which makes us question “what objects are not for us.” (p.22) The objects that are things in themselves are hypothetical ones which Kant probably raised for the solution of the possibility of human freedom and its relationship to science.

Kant describes his enterprise as a discourse on method not a systematic display of science. The positive point in it is that it limits the role of speculative reason but rather encourages the practical use of pure reason. With the practical use of pure reason, reason goes beyond the limits of sensibility. Kant asserts that space and time are forms of sensibility and are therefore conditions of appearances. Kant mentions that “We can not have knowledge of any object as a thing in itself, but only insofar as it is an object of sensible intuition, that is an appearance.” (Bxxvi, xxvii) All knowledge of speculative reason is within the limits of mere objects of experience. But we should always think that these objects are also things in themselves but we can not know them. In order to know an object, all its possibilities have to be proven, a fact that can either appear with the actuality of an object grasped by experience or a priori with reason.

Adams (1997) points out four roles played by the concept of things in themselves in Kantian thought. The first role is that the use of the concept of a thing in itself is to state what objects of experience are not. We know the appearances as how they appear to us and what spatiotemporal properties they possess. The second role is related to the regulative use of ideas, the concepts which according to Kant transcend the possibility of experience. A consideration of such regulation doesn’t consign us to believe in actual existence of things in themselves. The third role applies to Kant’s transcendental psychology, in which understanding is actively structuring the objects of experience and sensibility is passively giving what the understanding structures. Kant seems to be in favor of such an argument when he states “the transcendental object, which forms the foundation of outer appearances, and the other transcendental object, which forms the foundation of our inner intuition, is in itself neither matter, nor a thinking being, but is simply a ground (to us unknown) of appearances which supply us with the empirical concept of both.” A forth role is obvious in Kant’s practical philosophy. Practical reason displays that it’s not possible to justify some metaphysical propositions by theoretical reason. One example that Adams gives for such propositions is “there exists a God who orders all things in such a way that the attainment of the highest good is possible.” (ibid. p.804) It’s clear that justification of such propositions can not be grounded on theoretical reason and is a thing in itself rather than an object of experience.

Kant pictures the absence of the distinction between the objects of experience and things in themselves of these objects as; “In this case, the principle of causality and with it the mechanism of nature as determined by it, would apply to all things in general as efficient causes.” (Bxxviii) But with this distinction we can explain that one sense of object as appearance necessarily conforms to the law of nature and causality while the other sense of object belonging to a thing in itself doesn’t conform to the law of nature or causality. Therefore with speculative reason it’s not possible to know my soul or freedom as a thing in itself.

Chipman (1973) summarizes Kant’s assertions about things in themselves in five theses. The first one is that they are not exhibited in sensory data. The second one is that they are not spatiotemporal. The third thesis is that they are unknowable. The forth one is that the same object is referred to as both an appearance and thing in itself. The last thesis is that they are not subject to categories. The essentiality of the distinction is expressed by Walker.

However, we must notice that there are (though not very explicitly) other arguments present in the Critique to conclusions that go beyond the world of appearances. These are the arguments to show that there must be a subject of experiences that does not itself belong to the world of appearances, and that there must be things in themselves.… Kant’s transcendental idealism depends on them.

(2006, p. 248)

Hana states that Kant’s transcendental idealism has been formed by conjoining two theses. The first one is the transcendentalism thesis in which all contents of knowledge are ascertained by activities of synthesis of the a priori cognitive faculties of human reason. The second thesis is the idealism thesis in which all objects of knowledge are sensory experience and are not things in themselves. (2006)
Unknowability Thesis of Things in Themselves

The thesis that we can not know things in themselves is known as the unknowability thesis and is a radical aspect of Kant’s transcendental idealism. It is a conclusion from his theory of knowledge. “Kant’s analysis of human sensibility and understanding must logically accept unknowability thesis.” (Buroker, 2006) This thesis denies that we can have knowledge of the unconditioned. The idea of an uncaused cause may be given as an example for Kant’s use of the “unconditioned.” For Kant things in themselves are the conditions of the appearances. In other words, the existence of things in themselves is a logical presupposition of the appearances. The assumption that we know the impossibility of knowing the nature of things in themselves and the unknowability thesis may seem paradoxical. But the claim that things in themselves exist is a true predication predicating nothing about their natures.

Adams proposes that Kant thinks “we can not have synthetic beliefs that are theoretically justified about any sort of objects as they may be in themselves, but only as objects of actual or possible experience.” (1997, p.805) We don’t have intuitions that would make things in themselves given as objects for our knowledge.

Things in themselves are thought, not sensed. If we take away all intuition from an empirical knowledge what remains is the form of thought. Pure categories of understanding supply this form of thought. Kant calls a concept problematic if no contradiction is contained in it. In this sense a thing in itself included within the concept of noumenon is problematic. Kant says “the concept of a noumenon, that is of a thing which can never be thought as an object of senses, but only as a thing in itself (solely through pure understanding), is in no way contradictory; for we can not maintain that sensibility is the only possible kind of intuition.” (A254/B310)

Meerbote (1967) says that “to say things in themselves are unknowable is …merely to say that … objects in order to be known must satisfy particular conditions of knowledge.” To be able to know an object some criteria must be obtained. When something is called an appearance, those spatiotemporal objects are classified under certain a priori conditions. In this sense the unknowability of things in themselves are grounded on the doctrine of a priori conditions of experience. (cited in Ameriks, 1982, p. 3)

Non-Spatiotemporality of Things in Themselves

In Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant argues that we have two pure forms of intuition, space and time. In mathematics and mechanics space and time are the sources of synthetic a priori knowledge. Although these forms are empirically real, due to the fact that they are part of subject’s sensibility they are transcendentally ideal. Cicovacki proposes that “since they (things in themselves) are not spatially and temporally given, they can not be individuated, and thus not known.” (2006, p. 85) Therefore in Transcendental Aesthetic Kant emphasizes the unknowability of things in themselves in relation to their being non-spatiotemporal.

The second part of Transcendental Aesthetic includes discussions and conclusions about space and an indirect distinction between appearance and a thing in itself. An appearance is what appears to us in sensibility. It carries features of our subjectivity. Different from an appearance, thing in itself ought to have a nature separate from the subjective condition of our sensibility. Thus it should be considered as something distinct from the conditions of appearance and from its actual appearance in experience. (Burnham, 2007)

For space is a feature of appearances, Kant asserts that “space does not represent any property of any things in themselves, nor does it represent them in their relation to one another.” (A26/B42) Allison argues that space “…does not pertain to things in themselves. Thus, although empirically real or valid for all objects of human experience, it is also transcendentally ideal or not applicable to things in themselves.” (1976, p. 316) When abstracted from all subjective conditions of intuition, what remains is the thing in itself. But space, under subjective conditions can represent objects of sensibility or appearances. “Space comprehends all things which appear to us externally, but not all things in themselves…..” (A27/B43) Thus everything that comes to us externally as an object establish the reality and with regard to the things in themselves considered by reason, ideality of space is established. In the former we affirm empirical reality while in the latter we affirm transcendental ideality of space. Space is transcendentally ideal and empirically real, so is not a feature of things in themselves. Allison (1976) points out that in Kant’s argument of the a priori nature of space, it is proposed that space has both empirical reality and transcendental ideality.
The empirical reality is objective validity of appearances, while the transcendental validity is the lack of objective validity of things in themselves. Thus it is the appearances that are in space and things in themselves that are not. This can be supported by the following argument of Kant.

Our discussions therefore establish the reality, i.e., the objective validity, of space with regard to everything that can come to us externally as an object, and at the same time establish the ideality of space with regard to things when considered in themselves by reason, that is, without taking into account the constitution of our sensibility. Hence we assert the empirical reality of space (as far as all possible outer experience is concerned), but at the same time we assert its transcendental ideality; that is to say, we assert that space is nothing once we leave out of consideration the condition of the possibility of all experience, and accept space as something underlying things in themselves.

(A28/B44)

The following quotation clarifies that the things that are intuited in space are not things in themselves and things in themselves are impossible for us to know contrary to the external objects whose forms are space. Rather the thing in itself stands in a reciprocal relation to sensibility. It can not be known or questioned in experience.

The transcendental concept of appearances in space, on the contrary, is a critical reminder that nothing intuited in space is a thing in itself, that space is not a form of things which might belong to them in themselves, but that objects in themselves are not known to us at all, and that what we call external objects are nothing but mere representations of our sensibility, the form of which is space. The true correlate of sensibility, that is the thing in itself, is not known, nor can it be known at all through these representations, nor do we ever ask any questions about it in experience.

(A30/B45)

All intuitions are representations of appearances and we don’t intuit things in themselves. If subject is removed then all relations of objects in space and time will be lost. “What the objects may be in themselves would never become known to us even through the most enlightened knowledge of that which alone is given to us, namely their appearance.” (B61/A44) It doesn’t matter how clear the appearance is made to the intellect, the objects in themselves will never be known. No matter how clearly or wholly we see the appearance; the sensibility will always differ from the knowledge of the thing in itself. Kant addresses to philosophers like Leibniz and Wolff who refuted a difference between “sensible presentation and intellectual presentations of things in themselves.” (Burnham, 2007, p.54) Kant states that Leibniz and Wolff were wrong when expressing this difference as logical which directed the investigations into the nature of our knowledge to a misleading way. We can not know how things in themselves are constituted through our sensibility.

When people commonly think about appearances they distinguish them in two ways. One is attached to people’s intuition and the other belongs only contingently to the intuition. This distinction is empirical and the former is believed to exhibit the object in itself while the latter, the object’s appearance. But when such a distinction is supposed, transcendental distinction vanishes. In order to prove this, Kant gives the example of a rainbow during a sunny rain which is regarded as a mere appearance and rain which is regarded as a thing in itself. With this assumption the concept of a thing in itself is considered in a physical sense, as a thing which can be determined in relation to the senses in universal experience. But Kant stands opposed to an empirical consideration of this distinction, the attitude present in the following quotation.

But if we take this empirical something in general, and ask without considering whether it is the same for every human sense, whether it also represents an object in itself (not the drops of rain, for these are already as appearances, empirical objects), then the question as to the relation of the representation to the object becomes transcendental, and at that point not only are the drops mere appearances, but even their round shape, nay even the space in which they fall are nothing in themselves, but only modifications or foundations of our sensible intuition, and the transcendental object remains unknown to us.

(A46/B63)
Kant wants his readers to imagine space and time as being objective and thus conditions of the possibility of things in themselves, not forms of intuition involving a priori conditions, then in the absence of subjective conditions the objects would be nothing in themselves. This will lead to the view that nothing a priori and synthetic could be established about external objects.

Trendelenburg points out his objection, the neglected alternative, in the nineteenth century and criticizes Kant’s argument for ignoring the possibility of space’s being subjective and objective at the same time. (cited in Allison, 1976) Similarly, Kemp Smith asserts that “Kant recognizes only two alternatives, either space as objective is known a posteriori or being an a priori representation it is subjective in origin. There exists a third alternative, namely that although our representation of space is subjective in origin, space is itself an inherent property of things in themselves.” (cited in Allison, 1976, p. 314) Maass attacked Kant’s deficiency to recognize that the third alternative contradicts the unknowability of things in themselves. (cited in Allison, 1976) However, Allison tries to display that Kant’s argument is successful in preventing the third alternative and in explaining that things in themselves are not in space is consistent with the unknowability of things in themselves. (1976) Space and time are not things in themselves and not ontologically dependent on things in themselves. Rather, they are a priori necessary subjective forms of all empirical intuitions of appearances.

Are There Two Different Objects?

Ameriks (1982) notes that there are two groups of interpreters who comment on Kant’s distinction of appearances and things in themselves. The first group rejects that these are two different objects. The other group asserts that Kant makes the distinction in order to refer to two different objects. Among the first group, Graham Bird, when a thing in itself is denoted we don’t speak of something other than its appearance; we only consider that thing from an epistemic perspective. (Bird, 1962 cited in Ameriks, 1982) The first group of interpreters can be recognized in two subclasses: the one who are opposed to a separate idea of a thing in itself, the other who are for the idea of thinking some items as things in themselves. Melnick states the following about the concept of a thing in itself.

“The notion of a non-epistemic concept of what it is to be an object. It is an alternative conception of what is involved in being an object, the idea, namely, of a concept of an object that would have sense apart from any reference to how the experience of a subject hooks up epistemically to his intellectual structure….a thing in itself is not a different kind of thing … but rather a different kind of a concept of a thing.”

(Melnick, 1973, pp. 152, 154)

The second subclass of commentators denies the idea of two distinct objects but maintains the idea of two transcendental and intelligible aspects. This may be referred as “double aspect” interpretation. Allison (1976) insists that Kant believed in the non-spatiotemporality of things in themselves. If objects are considered as spatiotemporal, then they will be called appearances. But if objects are regarded as things in themselves, then they can not be considered as appearances. Such an idea would bear a problem for double aspect theory. Allison overcomes the problem by telling that the non-spatiotemporality of things in themselves is an analytic judgment while Kant’s argument deals with synthetic judgments.

The second group of interpreters, as mentioned at the beginning of this section, propose Kant’s use of two object theory of appearances and things in themselves. Gram (1975, cited in Ameriks, 1982) thinks that Kant’s view of space and time as forms of intuition requires separate entities like things in themselves. Wilkerson (1976) supports that “Kant’s theory of experience supposedly reduces objects to collections of sensations, in which case there wouldn’t be any independent empirical beings that would be around to be numerically identified with things in themselves.” (ibid. p.8)

Schrader (1949) maintains that the concept of a thing in itself, if considered from Kant’s critical employment, cannot be a second object. It is given in appearances, so is the same object that appears. “It is one and the same object considered from two perspectives….Things in themselves are intrinsically unknowable; hence, they are not objects, independent or otherwise.” (p. 30, 32) Kant’s use of the concept of transcendental object accompanies his use of things in themselves. The notion transcendental object may be considered as having twofold meaning; critically, a limiting concept and dogmatically, ground of appearances. The twofoldness of objects are also explained by Westphal (1968, p. 120) “The thing in itself is the same thing as the appearance.
There are not two objects, but one, which may be considered in two ways. This is most clearly expressed by referring to objects as they are in themselves and as they appear to us.” These are different modes of knowing the same object. An object in the way it appears to our knowledge is appearance and the same object as known in a different way is the thing in itself.

Prauss asserts that Kant’s use of the phrase of “thing in itself” is a shortened form of “thing- considered as it is in itself”. “In itself” indicates not a different kind of thing, rather the same object being considered in a different way other than an appearance. Therefore we come to the point of two different manners in considering the same object. (cited in Robinson, 1994) In Kant’s theoretical philosophy Lange rejects the thing in itself as a real entity. (cited in Malter, 1981) Likely, Bird claims that “our immanent reality consists of appearances.” (2006, p. 5)

The following quotation is taken from Critique of Pure Reason when Kant was contrasting transcendental idealism with transcendental realism. According to transcendental idealism, it can be seen that things in themselves do not appear us in space and time. Space and time are not conditions of things in themselves. However in transcendental realism, things in themselves are thought as appearances. In addition to this, the following except signals how important and crucial the distinction between appearances and things in themselves is for the transcendental philosophy of Kant.

By transcendental idealism I mean the doctrine that all appearances are regarded as mere representations, not as things in themselves, and that space and time, therefore are sensible forms of our intuition, not determinations given independently by themselves, or conditions of objects taken as things in themselves. Opposed to this transcendental idealism is a transcendental realism, which considers space and time as something given in itself (independent of our sensibility). Thus the transcendental realist imagines that all outer appearances (their reality being admitted) are things in themselves, existing independently of us and our sensibility and therefore existing outside us also according to pure concepts of the understanding.

(A369/B416)

Allison (2006) asserts that transcendental realism is not discussed systematically by Kant, but it is clear that Kant understood from transcendental realism a doctrine involving any view mere appearances as things in themselves. Kant believes that transcendental realism misinterpreted appearances and ignored the transcendental distinction between things as they appear and as they are in themselves.

The objects of experience are therefore never given in themselves, but only in our experience, and do not exist outside it at all. That there may be inhabitants on the moon, although no one has ever perceived them, must indeed be admitted; but it means no more than that in the possible progress of our experience we may meet with them; for everything is real that stands in a context with a perception, according to the laws f empirical progress.

(A493/B521)

The previous quotation shows that according to Kant, things in themselves do not exist outside experience. Kant exemplifies this with possible inhabitant of moon. The fact that we haven’t perceived any inhabitants may change in progress of experience. Non-sensible nature of things in themselves doesn’t prevent the ontological reality of things in themselves, despite their non-empirical status.

Conclusion

The aim of the present paper is to identify the importance of and necessity for the presentation of the distinction of appearances and things in themselves in Kantian critical philosophy. As noted in the discussion of the topic understanding of Kant’s transcendental idealism depends on how we interpret the distinction between appearances and things in themselves. Kant’s project of a scientific metaphysics is grounded on synthetic a priori knowledge. When analyzing pure synthetic knowledge, Kant mentions two nonuniform elements: the knowledge of appearances and the knowledge of things in themselves. These two are combined in concordance with reason’s necessary idea of the unconditioned.
According to Westphal, in the absence of this distinction “...transcendental ideality and empirical reality is vacuous...the antinomies are unsolved...the purported originality of the Copernican Revolution is reduced to the giving of fancy names to familiar distinctions.” (1968, p. 119) Robinson emphasizes the importance of this distinction as “only by means of this distinction can Kant explain how metaphysical knowledge – synthetic knowledge a priori- is possible; namely, as derived from the subject’s conditions of experience.” (1994, p.414) Likewise Walker mentions that “without things in themselves there would be nothing to supply the data that our minds can order, nothing a posteriori in experience, nothing that does not have its origin in our mental activity.” (2006, p. 248)

The distinction of appearances and things in themselves provides the idea that only the things that are appearances are subject to causality and laws of nature. However, things in themselves can not be explained by causality or any law of nature. Things in themselves are hypothetical things and supplies justification for the possibility of human freedom. It would be a fatal error to believe that all the propositions of metaphysics can be explained by laws of nature.

References


