The Compensatory Role of Self-Monitoring in Performance Appraisal

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Abstract
This field study examines how self-monitoring, leader-member exchange, and objective performance interactively influence performance appraisals. The results suggest that self-monitoring influences ratings beyond an employee’s observable performance and the relationship quality with the supervisor. High self-monitors with low objective performance levels receive higher ratings than low self-monitors with low objective performance. High self-monitors in low quality relationships with their supervisor received higher ratings relative to their objective performance, while low-self-monitors in low-quality relationships received lower ratings than their objective performance levels.

Keywords: Performance appraisal; self-monitoring; leader-member exchange; performance ratings; leadership.

1. Introduction

The self-monitoring construct has been studied in a variety of organizational research settings. Self-monitoring theory and research has established that there are systematic differences in the behavior of high versus low self-monitors with varying outcomes (see Gangestad & Snyder, 2000 for a review). The self-monitoring construct indicates that self-monitors are acutely sensitive to their social environment and, as a result, are keenly aware of what constitutes appropriate social behavior, the roles that others play, their status, their personality traits and preferences and the kinds of behavior that would please others. In particular, a self-monitor knows which behaviors are needed to project a desirable impression and possesses the social skills to display the behavior as the situation demands (Snyder, 1987). Armed with this knowledge, the self-monitor is able to tailor his or her behavior to meet the exigencies of the situation.

Several studies show that high and low self monitors behave differently and that their differential behavior has an impact on a variety of organizational processes. For example, high self monitors (HSMs) are more likely than low self-monitors (LSMs) to seek well-defined jobs that allow them to use their expressive skills (Snyder & Gangestad, 1982), succeed in boundary spanning roles (Caldwell and O’Reilly, 1982), emerge as leaders in some situations (Bedeian & Day, 2004; Garland & Beard, 1979; Zacarro, Foti, & Kenny, 1991), and acquire higher levels of status with coworkers (Flynn, Reagans, Amanatullah, & Ames, 2006). Scott, Barnes, and Wagner (2012) found that high self-monitors were able to display more variability than low self-monitors when dealing with customers and experienced fewer negative effects from acting in ways that were inconsistent with their feelings (surface acting). Some studies indirectly indicate that HSMs may have reaped more organizational benefits than LSMs. In two studies with employees from insurance companies (Sypher & Sypher, 1981; 1983), self-monitoring was positively related to job level. In a study by Gialcone and Falvo (1985), supermarket managers were higher in self-monitoring than non-managerial personnel. Kilduff and Day (1994) used a longitudinal study design and found that HSMs received more internal and cross-company promotions than LSMs. These studies indicate that high self-monitoring individuals may behave in ways that provide them with opportunities for advancement. In keeping with the general finding that high self-monitoring is related to positive outcomes, we may expect that high self-monitoring personality would be related to performance appraisal.
2. Self-monitoring and Performance Ratings

In the organizational literature, studies show that self-monitoring is related to subjective performance ratings in different ways. Caligiuri and Day (2000), for example, studied the effects of self-monitoring on three types of ratings in a cross-national (rater-ratee national similarity) setting. They found that HSMs were rated higher on expatriate assignment-specific items like transferring information and language and cultural proficiency than LSMs. In contrast, LSMs received better contextual performance (motivation, commitment, and maintaining good working relationships) ratings than HSMs. There were no effects of self-monitoring on the ratings of technical performance. Bizz and Soda (2011) argued that the HSMs in the Caligiuri and Day (2000) study were rated over an extended appraisal period, diminishing their need to engage in contextual performance to maintain a positive social image. Based on previous research, they argued that HSMs would have strong motives to engage in behaviors that project a favorable image or garner social recognition; their results, which showed a positive relationship between HSM and contextual performance, supported their argument. Ratings than their low self-monitoring counterparts because they occupied more central positions in social networks, particularly over time.

In a critical performance rating study, Miller and Cardy (2000) found lower rating convergence among peer, self, and supervisor for HSMs than for LSMs. The authors concluded that the tendency of HSMs to portray themselves differently to various audiences might explain the differences in rating convergence.

While studies such as these show that self-monitoring is selectively related to performance ratings, it is not clear whether high self-monitors are actually better performers or whether they are adept at receiving better ratings through manipulation of the social situation. A meta-analysis by Day, Unckless, Schleicher, and Hiller (2002) showed a weak but significantly higher relationship between self-monitoring and subjective measures of performance (r=.15) than objective measures of performance and advancement (r=.03). The different and low effect sizes suggest two lines of inquiry addressed in this paper. The first one is to examine the differential role of self-monitoring as it relates to subjective versus objective measures of performance. Given the very small effect sizes, the second is to explore situational/contextual appraisal factors that may moderate the relationship between self-monitoring and performance ratings.

The differential effect sizes between subjective and objective measures of performance found in the meta-analysis raise an interesting question about the relationship between self-monitoring and performance ratings. The question is whether HSMs are able to manipulate the situation to receive inflated ratings or whether their ratings are in line with their actual performance, measured objectively. Moser and Galais (2007) argue that the question of whether HSMs actually perform better, justifying their performance ratings, or use impression management to influence the rater, prompting inaccurate ratings, continues to be an unresolved issue. Furthermore, will the rating of that performance be influenced by self-monitoring even in the face of visible, objective performance measures? To answer this question, it is necessary to measure the performance of self-monitors objectively and independently of the subjective rating and then to examine the role of self-monitoring, taking the objective performance measure into account. This study includes both objective and subjective measures of the same performance to evaluate the relative effect of self-monitoring on performance ratings.

The low effect size, r=.15, computed in the meta-analysis indicates that the relationship between self-monitoring and performance ratings may not be simple or direct. Theoretical views of personality maintain that dispositions or traits account for a small portion of variance in social behavior and that the effects of personality are contingent on the situation (Judge and Kristof-Brown, 2003; Snyder & Ickes, 1985; Weiss and Adler, 1984). Barrick et al., 2005 contend that the relationship between personality traits and performance is generally moderated or mediated by situational or other dispositional variables.

In keeping with current theory and the results obtained from the meta-analysis, we believe that the relationship between self-monitoring and performance ratings relationship is not consistent across the performance spectrum and that it depends on the employee’s performance level itself. The essence of the self-monitoring construct is that HSMs evaluate their situation and adapt their behavior accordingly. The ability of HSMs to use self-presentation behavior to create a more positive image of their performance is supported in both laboratory and field studies (e.g. Day and Schleicher, 2006; Turnley & Bolino, 2001). High self-monitors, being acutely sensitive to features of the environment, are likely to be aware of the vagaries of the performance appraisal situation and know how appropriate self-presentation behavior can affect the attributions of competence made about them (Caldwell & Burger, 1997; Turnley & Bolino, 2001).
It follows, then, that HSMs will evaluate their performance standing and use adaptive self-presentation in unfavorable situations when such behavior is needed to improve their outcomes.

The research strategy employed in this study provides HSMs with clear, objective information about their performance. One might expect that HSMs will recognize the need to create desirable and favorable images when their performance level is low (from objective data) than when it is high. Conversely, LSMs may neither perceive the need nor possess the skill necessary to offset unfavorable images about the poor performance. We are proposing that self-monitoring has a compensatory role that is dependent on the level of the self-monitor’s performance such that self-monitoring has a differential influence on ratings for low-performing HSMs versus low-performing LSMs. Self-monitoring should have no effect on ratings for high-performing HSM employees because there is no need for adaptive behavior to compensate for performance. Our specific hypothesis is:

H1: Self-monitoring and objective performance will interactively influence ratings such that high objective performers will receive higher ratings than low objective performers regardless of their self-monitoring status; low performing HSMs will receive higher ratings than low performing LSMs.

3. The Social Context of Performance Appraisal

The second issue arising from the Day et al. (2002) finding of weak but significant effect sizes between self-monitoring and performance ratings is the need to consider contextual factors within the appraisal situation. In applying the interactionist reasoning used in this paper, it follows that self-monitoring is not likely to be related to performance ratings directly, but would depend upon facets of the appraisal situation. Among the various factors that could influence performance ratings, the one that is likely to play a critical role in self-monitor’s evaluation of their overall situation is the relationship between the rater and ratee. The role of dyadic quality and performance ratings has been extensively researched in the leader-member exchange (LMX) model of leadership (Wexley & Klimoski, 1984). Results of a large number of studies in the LMX area have established that an employee’s relationship with his/her supervisor influences performance ratings (Dienesch & Liden, 1986). More recent studies have addressed methodological issues with the LMX construct, such as supervisor-subordinate agreement (e.g., Markham, Yammarino, Murry, & Palanski, 2010) and employee comparisons with other employees (Vidyarthi, Liden, Anand, Erdogan, & Ghosh, 2010) and have found that these additional measures are related to performance ratings beyond individual-level LMX measures. Thus, stronger and more encompassing approaches to LMX measurement have contributed additional variance to the LMX-performance rating relationship. A study by Heneman, Greenberger, and Anonyuo (1989) supports the idea that leader-member exchange could contribute to differential evaluations favoring high LMX employees. Supervisors were more likely to make more positive attributions about "in-group" members' performance than "out-group" members' performance.

Although leader-member exchange is theoretically related to performance, research has shown that positive affect within the relationship, rather than actual performance of high LMX employees, influences performance ratings positively (Cardy & Dobbins, 1986; Ferris & Judge, 1991; Judge & Ferris, 1993; Wayne & Ferris, 1990; Varma, Denisi, & Peters, 1996). In related research, Alexander and Wilkins (1982) found that the nature of the interpersonal relationship was more strongly related to ratings of performance than objective measures of performance. This effect is supported in a meta-analysis by Gerstner and Day (1997) which showed that LMX was more strongly related to subjective measures (r=.30) versus objective measures (r=.11) of performance. These areas of research point to an overall positive rating bias favoring high LMX employees. The interactionist basis of personality theory and the empirical findings from the meta-analysis by Day et al. (2002) suggest that we should not expect self-monitoring to have a strong direct impact on performance ratings. Rather, self-monitoring only becomes a factor in conjunction with other critical variables in the appraisal process such as a ratee’s actual performance and the relationship between the rater and the ratee. Hence, we may expect that, together with actual performance (measured objectively), leader-member exchange may influence the relationship between self-monitoring and performance ratings.

The research question here is whether HSMs can overcome the effects of being in a less favorable situation (low-LMX). Flynn, Reagens, Amanatullah, and Ames (2006) found that HSMs accurately evaluate their own exchange relationship and those of others to put themselves in the best position to gain desired resources. Following our earlier logic, we believe that HSMs evaluate their leader-member relationship to determine if they need to compensate for their poor relationship with their supervisor.
Just as HSMs might perceive the need to offset their poor performance situation, they may feel a similar need to manage impressions if they feel they are in an out-group status. HSMs who perceive themselves to be part of the in-group would not benefit from impression management, making such behavior irrelevant. LSMs, by their nature, may prefer not to manage or manipulate the situation and, as a result, will not engage in activities to offset poor out-group status.

We expect that the relationship between self-monitoring and ratings is based both on the self-monitor’s performance level and on the leader-member exchange relationship. Self-monitoring has an effect beyond these two primary influences. As previously discussed, ratings are likely to be strongly influenced by ratee performance and the rater-ratee relationship. Well-established research evidence presented earlier points to the conclusion that employees who have high levels of performance or who are in high-LMX relationships can expect (through rating inflation) to receive high ratings on that basis. However, those employees who have low performance levels or are in low-LMX relationships will need to rely on self-monitoring skills to receive high ratings. LSMs, in contrast, are likely to pay the price for their lack of impression management and receive ratings consistent with their low performance levels.

In this part of the study, we are formulating the outcome variable as a “rating gain” versus a “rating loss”. A rating gain occurs when a ratee’s relative rating position is higher than his or her objective performance position. Conversely, a rating loss occurs when a ratee’s relative rating position is lower than his or her objective performance position. This strategy allows us to capture the influence of objective performance simultaneously with the rating of that performance. We believe that when the rater-ratee relationship is positive, self-monitoring is not a factor and that high LMX employees will receive rating gains compared with low LMX employees. This expectation is strongly supported by the LMX research cited earlier. When the perceived relationship with their supervisors is weak however, the influence of self-monitoring operates in favor of HSMs who will receive rating gains compared with LSMs. Our second hypothesis is:

\[ H2: \text{Self-monitoring and leader-member exchange will interactively influence rating gain/loss such that high LMX ratees will receive rating gains compared with low LMX ratees regardless of their self-monitoring status; low LMX ratees who are HSMs will receive rating gains while low LMX ratees who are LSMs will receive rating losses.} \]

The goal of this paper is to demonstrate that employees’ self-monitoring skills, performance, and the nature of the supervisor-subordinate relationship interactively influence performance ratings. The present study attempts to extend the findings from previous research on subordinate influence in several ways. First, the study specifies the role of self-monitoring skills in performance appraisal in accordance with relevant theory and empirical findings. Second, the paper integrates relevant performance appraisal and leadership research in specifying the way in which an employee’s personality may influence performance ratings. Third, the study includes the rater-ratee relationship as a key situational factor, consistent with the interactionist approach. Fourth, this field study complements the findings of studies that have examined the effects of self-monitoring in laboratory settings (Ilgen & Favero, 1985). Fifth, the study includes an objective indicator of an employee’s performance that was actually used by the organization to measure performance. Furthermore, the performance rating reflects the task dimension that is objectively measured in the study. Since LMX has been consistently related to other affective outcomes and organizational citizenship behaviors such as helping others (Waismel-Manor, Tziner, Berger, & Dikstein, 2010; Ilies, Nahrung, & Morgeson, 2007), it is important to ensure that raters are focused on the particular task that is being objectively measured. This allows any “rating gain” to be reasonably construed as inflation rather a rating of some other performance dimension such as organizational citizenship behaviors. Finally, this paper examined the interactive, rather than individual effects, of personality and situational factors on performance ratings.

4. Method
4.1. Subjects
Data were collected from 367 employees of a telephone company in the Southeastern United States. Questionnaires were administered to employees and their supervisors on company time. Although participation was voluntary, all employees (except for 11 who were on vacation) completed the questionnaires.
Of the 367 employees, 237 supervisor-subordinate pairs had complete data on all the variables in the study; 138 were directory assistance operators, 79 were cable technicians, and 20 were dispatch clerks. Twenty-five supervisors, with spans of control ranging between 8 and 18, rated their employees on various performance dimensions. Employees reported to a single supervisor. Objective measures of performance for the six-month period preceding questionnaire administration were obtained from company records. Thirty-seven per cent of the respondents were males and sixty-three per cent were females.

4. 2. Measures

4.2.1. Objective performance. An operator’s performance was measured in terms of the time taken to complete a call, with shorter times indicating better performance. This time was clocked by a computer. The cable splicers and joiners worked on various sites in the city. They were given their assignment at the beginning of the day, and their task was to complete the assignment correctly and as quickly as possible. There were established standards set for completion of a given assignment. The supervisor recorded the time spent on the various tasks at the end of every assignment each day. The dispatch clerks received service complaints from customers and recorded the information on the computer in a specified format. Their performance was also measured by the time taken to complete the format and was recorded by the computer. The performance measures were aggregated and averaged over six months, yielding a summary figure for the six-month period. These objective measures represent results-oriented indices of performance.


4.2.3. LMX. Employees completed the 7-item leader-member exchange scale (Graen, Novak, & Sommerkamp, 1982). For this study, coefficient alpha was .82.

4.2.4. Self-monitoring. Respondents completed the revised 18-item Self-monitoring Scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). The psychometric properties of the scale are discussed extensively by Gangestad & Snyder (2000). In their meta-analytic review Day et al. (2002), noted that it did not make any empirical difference which self-monitoring scale was used for purposes of validity in organizational research. In this study, coefficient alpha was .79 which is higher than the average coefficients alpha found for the different scales in the meta-analysis.

4.2.5. Ratings Gain/Loss. Difference score was computed as the difference between standardized objective performance and standardized performance rating. A rating gain results when a ratee receives a higher standardized performance rating than his/her standardized objective performance; conversely, a rating loss occurs when the standardized rating is lower than the standardized objective performance level. Difference scores have been shown to have sufficient reliability (Zimmerman, Williams, & Zumbo, 1993).

5. Analysis

Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations among the study variables were computed. To achieve parity across job types, objective performance measures were standardized within each job type. Raw scores were transformed to t-scores with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 20. According to the theoretical development of our paper, we proposed that performance, dyadic quality, and self-monitoring would interactively influence ratings. Moderated regressions were conducted to test the interactive effects of objective performance, the nature of the supervisor-subordinate relationship (LMX), and self-monitoring on supervisory ratings or ratings gain/loss. To test H1, the regression model contained supervisory ratings as the dependent variable. The independent variables were objective performance, self-monitoring (as main effects), and the two-way interaction between objective performance and self-monitoring. To test H2, the regression model contained ratings gain/loss as the dependent variable. The independent variables were leader-member exchange, self-monitoring (as main effects), and the two-way interaction between leader-member exchange and self-monitoring. The presence of moderating effects was determined by examining the significance of the interaction in the simultaneous regression containing the main effects and interaction terms (Cohen & Cohen, 1975). To examine the form of the interactions, regression lines were plotted for each of the dependent variables at high and low levels of the independent variables. Following Cohen and Cohen (1975), high and low values of the independent variables were set at one standard deviation above and below the variable's mean.
6. Results

Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and inter-correlations among the study variables. The result of the moderated regressions for H1 is presented in Table 2. The first regression (H1) tests the interaction effects of objective performance and self-monitoring on performance ratings. The results support Hypothesis 1 with the overall model being significant (F=54.24; df: 3, 237, p<.001) and the Objective Performance x Self-monitoring interaction term being significant as well (t=-2.43, p<.05). The plot of the interaction is shown in Figure 1. The results and accompanying plot indicate that the relationship between self-monitoring and performance ratings is dependent on the level of objective performance. High performers receive high ratings regardless of their self-monitoring. For low performers, ratings improve as self-monitoring increases.

The result of the moderated regressions for H2 is presented in Table 3. The second regression (H2) tests the interaction effects of leader-member exchange and self-monitoring on ratings gain/loss. The results support Hypothesis 2 with the overall model being significant (F=3.80; df: 3, 237, p<.05) and the Leader-member Exchange x Self-monitoring interaction term being significant as well (t=-2.089, p<.05). The plot of the interaction is shown in Figure 2. The results and accompanying plot indicate that the relationship between self-monitoring and ratings gain/loss is dependent on leader-member exchange. High LMX ratees generally experience rating gains regardless of their self-monitoring. For low LMX employees, rating gains increase (from losses) as self-monitoring increases.

7. Discussion

This study was undertaken to clarify the role of self-monitoring in performance appraisal. Previous findings showed weak but significant relationships between self-monitoring and ratings and even weaker effect sizes for objective performance. Drawing on theory and previous research, we hypothesized 1) that the relationship between self-monitoring and ratings may not be direct, and 2) the rater-ratee relationship is an important factor in understanding how self-monitoring is related to performance appraisal. Both our hypotheses stipulated a compensatory role for self-monitoring in that self-monitoring has an impact when employees find themselves in unfavorable situations. Results supporting our first hypothesis indicate that self-monitoring becomes relevant when performance is deficient. Similarly, results supporting our second hypothesis show a positive compensatory role for self-monitoring when individuals perceive themselves to be in an unfavorable relationship with their supervisor.

While this aspect was not measured, the results suggest that HSMs may have attempted to compensate for low objective performance and low leader-member exchange by engaging in appropriate self-presentation behaviors to influence their supervisor’s impressions of them. High self-monitors are likely to know how to rationalize their actions and manage information that others receive about them (Caldwell & O’Reilly, 1982). They carefully evaluate their situations for cues regarding supervisor expectations and responses, and are likely to know that, despite the presence of objective information, their supervisors use some degree of subjectivity in their ratings of employees. In contrast, LSMs with low objective performance and low leader-member exchange received commensurately low performance ratings. This result is consistent with the theoretical position that low self-monitors display a greater degree of consistency between their situational cues and behavior. Simply put, LSMs are less concerned and comfortable about representing themselves as something they are not, and as a result, are not adept at engaging in behavior that might create a more favorable impression than reality supports. Given that the supervisor has no information to the contrary, he or she is inclined to rate these employees in a manner consistent with their actual performance and leader member exchange status.

7.1. Implications for Theory and Research

The results of this study demonstrate the importance of including self-monitoring as a component in models of the performance appraisal process, particularly when the political nature of this process is considered. As recognized by Ferris and Judge (1991), HSMs are in a position to adjust their behavior to present more favorable impressions of themselves, and, thus may use impression management techniques to enhance their outcomes in selection, performance evaluation, promotion, and/or compensation decisions. This study extended our knowledge of the role of self-monitoring in the performance appraisal area by showing its influence on performance ratings when objective performance and leader-member exchange quality were low.
However, this study did not include the specific impression management behaviors that were chosen by HSMs to compensate for low performance and low LMX. Previous research has established relationships between impression management and ratings (e.g., Wayne & Kacmar, 1991; Ferris et al., 1994), self-monitoring and impression management (e.g., Caldwell & O’Reilly, 1982; Fandt & Ferris, 1990; Turnley & Bolino, 2001), and self-monitoring and ratings (Caligiuri & Day, 2000; Day et al., 2002; Mehra et al., 2001). Self-monitoring, impression management, objective performance and ratings have not been studied simultaneously. The dynamic process by which HSMs may use impression management techniques to promote positive perceptions of their performance in the face of contradictory performance and relationship information should be a topic for future research. Attention to the dynamics of the process would also be helpful in explaining how HSMs might present themselves to avoid the negative consequences that may arise if their supervisors perceive that they are manipulating information or deceiving deliberately.

Future theory and research should also attempt to expand the interactionist perspective presented in this paper to include other situational factors. Clearly, this perspective recognizes that self-monitors are active participants in the rating process and that they tailor self-presentation approaches to the demands of the situation. It is noteworthy that the results of the key meta-analysis conducted by Day et al. (2002) showed that self-monitoring explained little variance in objective and subjective measures of performance. This suggests that other constructs and variables are necessary to further explain the relationship between this personality variable and outcomes. In this study, we chose two factors, objective performance and leader-member exchange, to which self-monitors would pay attention in their efforts to influence their supervisor’s perceptions of their performance. Leary and Kowalski (1990) recognized several other factors, including the importance of making a good impression, the need to maintain self-esteem, and social and material outcomes that may have an influence on an individual’s motivation to create an impression. They further suggested that a different set of factors may be related to an individual’s choices of impression content. Moser and Galais (2007) contend that HSMs may decide on impression management strategies based on their ability and opportunity to control the cues of those who evaluate their performance. They found that self-monitoring was related to performance only for individuals with less tenure, when there is more opportunity to form an impression. While we relied on theory and research to guide the selection of salient cues for self-monitors, future theory and research should delineate other situational factors that might be important in influencing either the motivation of high self-monitors to engage in impression management activity and/or the process used to select particular tactics.

7.2. Practical Implications and Limitations

This study has practical implications for organizations seeking to enhance the effectiveness of their performance appraisal systems. The results point to a possible bias operating in favor of high self-monitors and high LMX employees. Taken together, the results in our paper suggest that even rating scales based on specific, presumably observable behaviors, such as the quantity of performance measure used in this study, are susceptible to a variety of social, situational, affective, and cognitive influences (Ferris et al., 1994). As discussed earlier, it may be that supervisors are totally unaware of their tendency to factor the results of high self-monitoring and leader-member exchange into their rating decisions. However, opting for objective, results-oriented measures to avoid the biases in rating scales may not necessarily improve on the performance information obtained, particularly given the limited information such measures provide. Perhaps organizations would be better served by using a combination of different measures and sources of information to capture performance completely and by training raters to accurately observe and record performance as it occurs.

Of course, this study has limitations that must be addressed. The contemporaneous measurement of all the variables in this study precludes conclusions regarding causality. Thus, the dynamic nature of the relationships proposed in this study cannot be ascertained without a longitudinal assessment of the processes involved. Additionally, although the data in this study are based on more than one job, they represent only the particular organization sampled. It is necessary to replicate the findings in other organizations and settings. We used a single item rating of performance quantity in this study to allow us to include objective performance data. Raters may formally or informally define performance in broader terms than represented by the variables in this study. Recent research has found that HSMs, in comparison to LSMs, engage in a greater number of organizational citizenship behaviors (e.g. Blakely, Andrews, and Fuller, 2003) and contextual performance behaviors that complement the task (Bizzi & Soda, 2011).
It may be that raters are using a broader context of performance that takes these additional behaviors into account even when called upon to rate a narrow facet of performance.

In sum, we proposed that self-monitoring would influence performance ratings in a contingent manner that depended on the ratees’ performance level and the nature of the relationship with their supervisor. Although the results supported our hypotheses, work is needed to fully understand the dynamic processes involved in the influence of self-monitoring on performance ratings. Hopefully, our study will encourage future research in this area.

8. References


**Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Inter-correlations (N=237)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Ratings of performance</td>
<td>5.40</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Standardized objective performance</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>.593**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Self-monitoring</td>
<td>6.68</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>.180**</td>
<td>.021**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>4. Leader-member exchange</td>
<td>20.42</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>.235**</td>
<td>.082ns</td>
<td>.006ns</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Ratings-performance difference</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>.398**</td>
<td>-.502**</td>
<td>-.051ns</td>
<td>.159*</td>
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*p<.05; **p<.01 ***p<.001

**Table 2: Simultaneous Regression of the Interactive Effects of Objective Performance and Self-Monitoring on Ratings of Performance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>β</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-1.455</td>
<td>.864</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective performance</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.831***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-monitoring</td>
<td>.0241</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td>.602*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Objective performance x Self-monitoring</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>-.623*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: F=54.24; df: 3, 237, p<.001

*p<.05; **p<.01 ***p<.001

**Table 3: Simultaneous Regression of the Interactive Effects of Self-Monitoring and Leader-member Exchange on Performance Ratings Gains/Losses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>β</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Self-monitoring</td>
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<td>.072</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leader-member Exchange</td>
<td>.074</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.406**</td>
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<td>Self-monitoring x Leader-member Exchange</td>
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<td>.003</td>
<td>-.716*</td>
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</table>

Note: F=3.80; df: 3, 237, p<.05

*p<.05; **p<.01 ***p<.001
Figure 1. Performance ratings for levels of self-monitoring as function of levels of objective performance.

Figure 2. Performance ratings gains/losses for levels of self-monitoring as function of levels of leader-member exchange.