Toleration as a Mean in Multiculturalism

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Abstract
Multiculturalism based on toleration negates the politics of exclusion. Scholarly research on the histories of exclusion, degradation, non-recognition and difference of cultural groups suggests that multiculturalism must address histories of exclusion and domination. Now a question arises “What are the basis of multiculturalism as an approach? The present work tries to put and justify the thesis that it is toleration which forms the basis of approaches to modern multicultural societies. The study highlights the works of prominent scholars in the field; namely John Rawls, John Raz, Parekh, Will Kymlicka, and Chandran Kukathas and tries to show with justification that the base of each scholar’s theory is toleration. The work also catches a different aspect of toleration as an answer to the problems of pluralism-toleration as compromise. It shows that in majority of the cases toleration is not applied as a value in itself; rather it is applied for the sake of another value(s)-reward, peace and order or peaceful co-existence to mention a few.

Key Words: Toleration, Multiculturality, Multiculturalism, Assimilation, Cosmopolitanism, Fragmented Pluralism, Interactive Pluralism and State Neutrality.

1. Introduction
The peak of tolerance is most readily achieved by those who are not burdened with convictions. (Alexander Chase)
The trouble with the world is that the stupid is cocksure and the intelligent is full of doubt. (Bertrand Russell)
The explosion of media, globalization, rising awareness of people through education, especially in developing states, vast degree of migration to developed states especially to the US, Canada and Australia, and the saturation of the feelings of exclusion in term of hate and degradation of minorities have exposed the problems of multicultural society. Pluralism has become a ‘fact’ that moral and political philosophy cannot bypass when thinking about the terms of fair co-operation in society. As McKnight (2000) mentions, the universalisability of moral judgments is not a cross-cultural feature; diversity must be accepted as a fact and be recognized as existed. In this sense I take multiculturalism as a positive- not against unity or stability (based on the principle of justice because forced assimilation is against justice) and factual (on rational grounds we cannot deny its existence) phenomenon. This is what Nathan Glazer said ”We are all multiculturalists now,” and also the Supreme Court of the US ruling on affirmative action wrote a majority decision that held diversity to be central to the dream of the nation and the legitimacy of the ruling class (Hartmann and Gerteis, 2005: 218). The possible justification for multiculturalism as an approach to plurality (being a fact of the modern society) is that it is a precondition of a harmonious and stable community. If a society is homogeneous we need not to worry about its stability. It is heterogeneity which is a problem but we have no justification for either forcible assimilation or physical elimination of minority groups. It is here that pluralist toleration results in agreement to disagree which is an adequate basis for social harmony and stability in heterogeneous societies.
Though the existence of minorities is an historical phenomenon, modern minorities differ from the past ones because; (i) as against the modern minorities, the pre-modern minorities had accepted their subordinate position; (ii) the rising importance of cultures and the awareness of the greater acceptence of cultural differences; (iii) economic and cultural globalization in modern time; and (iv) the assimilationist motto of the modern states and the recognition of individual as the bearer of rights rather than the group (Parekh, 2000: 7-9).

In such a situation the concept of Nation-State based on comprehensive liberalism cannot be justified as an acceptable mechanism for minorities. There are innumerable centrifugal forces struggling for national and cultural autonomy in various so-called nation-states. To quote Taylor, Guttmann, Rockefeller, Walzer & Wolf (1994), relativist philosophies such as communitarianism and postmodemism deny the possibility of universal standards of knowledge or morality. To achieve peaceful co-existence as an essence of multiculturalism requires for minorities an oxygenated space fully equipped with the concept of toleration. This requires the politics of recognition, not recognition as acceptance but recognition as existence.

The practice of toleration is indispensable to any modern ethnically pluralist society and especially to a multicultural society. The ideal of toleration has traditionally been one of the liberalism’s principal values. According to Lukes (1991: 17) liberalism was born out of religious conflict and the attempt to tame it by accommodating it within the framework of the nation state. The case for religious toleration was central to its development.

In this context I view toleration as the base of and a mean in multiculturalism. The base of each scholar’s theory in the field is toleration given different names-autonomy, justice, value of culture and freedom of conscience. Again I take toleration not as an absolute value (toleration as a virtue) in itself. It is most often exercised as a compromise phenomenon. The aim is always the same-not to aggravate the situation, to maintain peaceful co-existence, to gain stability, to gain justice, to gain short or long term benefits and so on and so forth as McKinnon, and Castiglione, (2003: 1) argue that toleration is a set of institutional arrangements for peaceful coexistence. According to McKinnon (2006: 22) toleration mediates hostilities to ensure a degree of peace between the parties who oppose one another. Crowder (1994) and Berlin and Williams (1994) also put forward the peace and stability as an end of toleration as they say that the argument is that if differences between people are inevitable and incommensurable then political principles of toleration will always be necessary to ensure that those with power do not use coercive force or propaganda to attempt illegitimately to eradicate those who differ from them. Political principles of toleration are necessary for preserving peace, stability and justice between people divided by incommensurable differences. Though there will be people who might value toleration in an absolute term, valuing toleration as a virtue, that approach is not a practical one-that cannot be put forward as a convincing argument.

In the second section I will give the definitions of multicultural and multiculturalism. The third section deals with toleration as a concept. It will highlight the various features of toleration expounded by various scholars. The fourth section gives a short but concise introduction to the theories of John Rawls, John Raz, John Stuart Mill, Parekh, Will Kymlicka and Chandran Kukathas and tries to justify that the bases of their theories is toleration and toleration as compromise. The fifth section deals in short with the limits of toleration. The sixth section draws the conclusion.

2. Defining Multiculturalism

In this study multiculturalism is taken as an approach to the problem of diversity, which is quite similar to that of Hartmann and Gerteis’ (2005) and Parekh’s (2000) conception of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is best understood as a critical-theoretical project, an exercise in cultivating new conceptions of solidarity in the context of dealing with the realities of increasing diversity in contemporary societies. Multiculturalism is a response or a set of responses to diversity that seeks to articulate the social conditions under which difference can be incorporated and order achieved from diversity (Hartmann and Gerteis, Jun., 2005). Some scholars insist that shared substantive bonds and practices are necessary for the maintenance of social cohesion. Others see this as impractical or undesirable and instead see shared norms or adherence to common legal codes as sufficient. This same division may also be found in terms of "thick" and "thin" forces of cohesion. A substantive conception of moral bonds provides for a thick form of solidarity, as order here would rest on deeply shared substantive commitments.
Thick visions emphasize the need for commonality: shared lifestyles, values, mutual recognition, and understanding. On the other hand, the thinner conception accepts that different values, commitments, and practices will remain but propose that shared procedural rules in the forms of norms or laws can provide a covering adequate to maintain social order even in the face of deep moral divisions (Hartmann and Gerteis, 2005: 223). Highly heterogeneous societies require the thin model as a viable social and political arrangement and as a base for social and political stability.

Hartmann and Gerteis (2005) elaborate four kinds of diversity (referred as multicultural by Parekh but which I think is not a kind of diversity but approaches to it):

I. **Assimilation:** This vision supports substantive moral bonds as the basis for moral cohesion. Assimilationism strongly denies the mediating role of groups. The group and the nation are the same. The boundaries of the social whole thus tend to be strong, while internal group boundaries are weak. It forces the individuals to lose the characteristics of prior outsider identities and to accept the society's main values. This vision deals with difference by removing it. Difference is believed as something dangerous, to be rid of or at least minimized. The emphasis is instead on cultural homogeneity and conformity. Private difference may be tolerated under this conception of plurality only if it is not pushed into the public sphere.

II. **Cosmopolitanism:** The cosmopolitan approach supports diversity only if it allows and expands individual rights and freedom. The most important features of cosmopolitanism are its lack of cultural specificity and the resulting vagueness of its external boundary. While the assimilationist conception sees a strong macro-boundary and a thick, substantive understanding of moral solidarity, cosmopolitanism emphasizes a thinner, more procedural understanding of the macro-culture. The emphasis in this vision is on tolerance and individual choice rather than mutual obligations. It does not insist that all members share the same main principles. For the individuals, membership in the social whole is one among many sources of identity, and not necessarily the most salient. It is the thinnest of the visions, but it is at least one in which diversity exists without major conflicts.

III. **Fragmented Pluralism:** this version supports the existence of a number of unique and independent communities as a social reality, but also as a necessity and strength. Structurally, it is the closest to being the opposite of assimilation. It supports procedural norms rather than common moral bonds and give emphasis on the role of groups and tends toward a weaker macro-social boundary but very strong internal groups and boundaries. Under assimilationism, the social groups are absorbed into the social whole. Under fragmented pluralism, the social whole is dissolved into its component collective units. For cosmopolitanism, group membership was a matter of individual choice. Here, group membership is seen as essential rather than voluntary. It implies social units that are more or less autonomous and discrete, and group self-determination is considered as vital for identity. Conformity force is strong here, but it is group-specific rather than conformity to a common center which is the feature of assimilation.

IV. **Interactive Pluralism:** Here distinct groups and cultures exist but emphasizes the need to cultivate common understanding across these differences through their mutual recognition and constant interaction. Cross-cultural dialogue and exchange becomes the crucial feature and value to be cultivated. For interactive pluralism the emphasis is on mutual recognition and respect of differences. Like fragmented pluralism, it points to the importance of groups as the chief basis for association in society but with a difference in emphasis. While both visions prioritize the role of groups, interactive pluralism emphasizes inter-groups interaction.

Thus we can depict Hartmann and Gerteis (2005) categorization as below

**Spectrum of Diversity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assimilation</th>
<th>Cosmopolitanism</th>
<th>Fragmented Pluralism</th>
<th>Interactive Pluralism</th>
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Parekh (2000: 3-5) makes a distinction between the fact of diversity and approach toward it. He uses the word *Multicultural* for the existence of diversity in a society and mentions the following three forms of diversity
I. Sub-cultural Diversity: Though sharing a broadly common culture, some of the members of plural society might have different behavior, practices and beliefs etc. pertaining to a particular area of life like gays, lesbians and miners etc. They follow the dominant system of meaning but try to find a place for their deviant behaviors in it. It is embedded in a share culture and wants to diversify and open rather than replace it.

II. Perspective Diversity: Here some of the members of the society are very critical of some of the prevailing valves of the system and struggle for its modification and correction. It is more radical and comprehensive than sub-cultural diversity. The members have a vision which the dominant society either ignores or only accepts in theory. Feminists attack of patriarchy and Islamists of secularism are examples.

III. Communal Diversity: This is the attempt of self-conscious and more or less organized group to live according to their own value system. This sort of diversity is firm and strong and cannot be accommodated easily. Newly arrived immigrants, Gypsies, Amish, various religious communities, Indigenous and the Quebecois are the examples.

On the other hand multiculturalism refers to the normative approach to diversity (Parekh, 2000: 6). How to face the problems of pluralism?, either to assimilate the different diversities in the broader value system or to give them some space where they could practice some of their beliefs (Cosmopolitanism) or leave them autonomous areas (Fragmented Pluralism or Interactive Pluralism).

3. Defining Toleration

According to McKinnon, and Castiglione (2003: 2), the toleration debate has entered its third phase. It first originated as a rational answer to the social and political conflict that divided European societies along religious lines. Though the emphasis on religious tolerance can be traced to considerations of prudence and political realism, from a more principled perspective, toleration was supported over skeptical and secularist lines, setting aside the truth-content of religious beliefs and their relevance for social and political coexistence. The second phase of the toleration debate continued the process of confining religious beliefs to a private rather than a public matter. At this stage the state was believed to be acting as a neutral arbiter over its citizens’ different ideas of the good life. Modern version of toleration seems to act according to the prudential maxim of indifference to others: ‘live and let live’.

According to Şahin (2010: 5-8) “toleration is non-interference in another’s activities though one has power to control those activities. Tolerated comprises four components; Subjects, tolerating (having capacity) and tolerated; Object, beliefs or practices that one can change (those that cannot be changed are accepted rather than tolerated); the presence of negative attitude towards the object of toleration; and a significant degree of restraint on the part of tolerating person. However, rational persuasion is not intolerance. Again, it must also be remembered that toleration does not remove difference; it only avoids conflicts from getting worse.

Nicholson (1985: 162) defines toleration as “the virtue of refraining from exercising one’s power to interfere with others’ opinion or action although that deviates from one’s own over something morally important and although one morally disapproves of it”. He says that toleration is not a second best, a necessary evil or a putting up with what we have to for the sake of peace and quiet, but a positive good, a virtue distinctive of the best people and the best societies (1985: 166).

Cohen (2004) defines toleration as (i) an agent’s (ii) intentional (he is aware of the opposed behavior) and (iii) principled (toleration must be for some value or good) (iv) refraining from interfering with (but persuasion) (v) an opposed (vi) other or their behaviors etc. (vii) in situation of diversity, where (viii) the agent believes she has the power to interfere. He differentiates toleration from indifference. We are indifferent to the actions which do not annoy us but are tolerant to which annoy us. Tolerating is not strict principle of non-interferences. It allows rational dialogue. For toleration to be effective one must value his belief or action.

Forst (2003) outlines six characteristics of toleration

I. There is always a particular ‘context of toleration’. This refers to the relation between the tolerator and the tolerated.
II. It is vital to the concept of toleration that the tolerated beliefs or practices are judged to be wrong or bad. This can be called the ‘objection component’. If this component is absent, there is either indifference or affirmation – two attitudes that are incompatible with toleration.

III. Tolerations require a positive ‘acceptance component’ which does not cancel out the negative judgment but gives certain positive reasons which trump the negative ones in the relevant context. The said practices or beliefs, then, are considered to be wrong, but not intolerably wrong.

IV. The concept of toleration must have the idea of certain ‘limits of toleration’. They lie at the point where reasons for rejection become stronger than the acceptance reasons.

V. The exercise of toleration cannot result from compulsion, since the tolerating subjects would then be under an impossibility of voicing their objections and acting accordingly. If this were the case, they would merely ‘endure’ or ‘suffer’ certain practices or beliefs against which they are powerless; and

VI. Tolerations as a practice and tolerance as an attitude must be distinguished.

Forst (2003) then outlines four perceptions of toleration that represent different understandings of what toleration consists in. Those understandings are to be simultaneously present in a society, so that conflicts about the meaning of toleration may be understood as conflicts between these conceptions. These are:

I. Permission Conception: Here, toleration is a relation between an authority or a majority and a dissenting minority (or various minorities). Tolerations then mean that the authority (or majority) gives qualified consent to the members of the minority to live according to their beliefs on the condition that the minority will recognize the dominant position of the authority (or majority). Here on the condition shows compromise. The majority tolerates because the minority accepts the dominant position of the majority.

II. Co-existence Conception: It is similar to the permission conception in regarding toleration as the best means to end or avoid conflict (compromise). Here also toleration is not understood as a value in itself or as a moral duty. It is primarily justified as a pragmatic instrumental way. With respect to the co-existence conception, its circumstances are not those in which an authority or majority stands over a minority, but rather one of groups, having about equal power, who see that for the sake of social peace and their own interests (compromise) toleration is the best of all possible alternatives. These groups prefer peaceful co-existence to conflict and agree to a reciprocal compromise, to a certain modus vivendi.

III. Respect Conception: It is one in which the parties tolerating each other and respect one another in a more reciprocal sense (compromise). On moral grounds they regard themselves and others as citizens of a state in which members of all groups (majority or minorities) should have equal legal and political status; and

IV. Esteem Conception: This implies a fuller notion of mutual recognition between citizens than that of the ‘respect conception’. Accordingly, being tolerant does not mean respecting members of other groups as moral and political equals, but rather, it means having some kind of ethical esteem for them; that is, regarding their beliefs as ethically valuable conceptions that are, though different from one’s own, in some way ethically attractive and held for good reasons. However, this perception could be objected on the ground that if some beliefs are accepted, then they are not tolerated but recognized and it is not toleration at all.

Forst (2003) says that an action to be tolerated must fulfill the criteria of Reciprocity and Generality. Reciprocity means that A cannot claim a right or a resource she denies to B and that the formulation of the claim and the reasons given must be open to questioning and not be determined by one party only. Generality means that the reasons that are sufficient to support the validity of norms should not just be acceptable to the dominant parties in a society but to every person and party involved.

According to MacKinnon (2006: 19; 23; 28), a person is tolerant when she refrains, on principled grounds, from acting on her disposition to oppress or interfere with another person or group in order to prevent them from engaging in practices or exhibiting properties to which she dislikes and/or of which she disapproves (weak interpretation) or evaluatively disapproves (strong interpretation) or is responsibly opposed (wide interpretation). MacKinnon (2006: 14) mentions the following six essential structural features of toleration:

I. Difference: what is tolerated differs from the tolerator’s conception of what should be done, valued, or believed.

II. Importance: what is tolerated by the tolerator is not trivial to her.
III. **Opposition:** the tolerator disapproves of and/or dislikes what she tolerates, and is *ipso facto* disposed to act so as to alter or suppress what she opposes. He explains three interpretation of opposition; firstly *weak interpretation* which allows that toleration can be a response both to disapproved of differences and to disliked differences; secondly, *strong interpretation* means that toleration is properly thought of as simply a response to differences evaluatively disapproved of by the tolerator and thirdly, *wide interpretation*, where the claim is that the ‘cut’ between dislike and disapproval is the wrong one for the characterization of opposition; rather, toleration should be thought of as a response to judgments of dislike or disapproval for which the tolerator takes responsibility, and thereby genuinely takes to be justified (2006: 18-19).

IV. **Power:** the tolerator believes herself to have the power to alter or suppress what is tolerated.

V. **Non-rejection:** the tolerator does not exercise his power; and

VI. **Requirement:** toleration is right and/or expedient, and the tolerator is virtuous, and/or just, and/or prudent.

According to Galeotti (2002: 93-94), the issue of toleration develops (i) around a contest between majorities and minorities, coexisting in a given society; (ii) over traits, behavior, beliefs, and practices of minority groups, labeled as different and disliked by the majority; (iii) when the minority group is perceived as posing a threat to the traditional order and the customary life of that society; and (iv) when it is willing to resist intolerance, and to claim public toleration for its differences.

Various scholars have justified toleration on various grounds. Şahin (2010: 9) justifies toleration on four grounds namely; skepticism, prudence, autonomy, and freedom of conscience. MacKinnon (2006: 67) justifies it by the requirement that each person ought to accept that it is unreasonable for her to attempt to impose her responsibly held commitments on another person or group, so long as the disagreement between herself and this person or group which generates their opposition is a reasonable one. On this view, what justifies toleration is the unreasonableness of intolerance.

Summarizing the above definitions, we can pinpoint the essentials of toleration as: (i) it is an act of non-interference by a powerful in the hated activities, customs and beliefs, which are considered as abnormal (where the normal is defined by the powerful majority) of minorities; (ii) the majority has the power to control the hated custom or beliefs but abstains from interfering; (iii) this abstention is always for some value (toleration as a value in itself much rare or for the sake of some other value-peaceful co-existence, order, stability or justice); (iv) the object of toleration is not trivial but important; and (v) there are always limits to toleration.

4. **Toleration as Compromise Given Different Names**

In this section I will discuss the theories of John Rawls, Joseph Raz, John Stuart Mill, Bhikhu Parekh, Will Kymlicka and Chandran Kukathas and will justify that their response to pluralism is just toleration and again toleration as compromise given different names.

I. **John Rawls and Pluralism:** While expounding *Political Liberalism* (which I think is as comprehensive as the original one, *Theory of Justice*, but with different name and restricted to political realm), Rawls argued that the *Theory of Justice* provides an unrealistic stability in a plural society (1993: vi-xvii). In the *Theory of Justice*, he mentions two principles of justice and said that the political structure of plural society should be based on them. The first principle says that “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others”. The second says that “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all” (1971:60). However, he distanced himself in *Political Liberalism* from this position in order to make his theory acceptable to diversity and accommodate diverse perceptions.

In *political liberalism* Rawls says that in the political domain the conception of justice should be, as far as possible, independent of the opposing and conflicting philosophical and religious doctrines that citizens affirm. In formulating such a conception, political liberalism applies the principle of toleration. Comprehensive philosophical and moral doctrines cannot be endorsed by the citizens generally and they also no longer can serve as the professed basis of society.
Political liberalism, according to Rawls, looks for a political conception of justice which can gain the support of an overlapping consensus of reasonable (emphasis added) religious, philosophical and moral doctrine in a society regulated by it. This is an answer to the question “how citizens who remain deeply divided on religious, philosophical and moral doctrines can still maintain a just and stable democratic society”. However, the political sphere and its conception of justice should be spelled out in such a way that its institutions can achieve the support of an overlapping consensus. In this case, the citizen themselves, within the exercise of their liberty of thought and conscience and looking to their comprehensive doctrines, view the political conception as derived from, or congruent with, or at least not in conflict with, their other values (1993: 9-11).

In the idea of overlapping consensus the each of the reasonable comprehensive doctrines endorse, from its own point of view, the political conceptions. The idea of overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines is necessary for the unity and stability of a well-ordered society. Social unity is based on a consensus on the political conception; and stability is possible when the doctrines making up the consensus are affirmed by the society’s politically active citizens and the requirements of justice are not too much in conflict with citizens’ essential interests as formed and encouraged by their social arrangements (1993: 134). This statement of Rawls supports our thesis that there is an element of toleration as a compromise-unity and stability of a well-order society. Rawls says that the comprehensive doctrines of most people are not fully comprehensive and this allows scope for the development of an independent allegiance to the political conception that helps to bring about consensus (1993: 168). In Political Liberalism, his aim is a bit practical which offers a conception of justice not based on truth but provides a workable and shared co-operation between citizens holding different comprehensive doctrines. He thinks that the democratic public culture is neutral and capable of providing a non-doctrinal basis for a society divided by comprehensive doctrines.

Rawlsian political liberalism thus might be likened to a tightly sealed condition of deliberation that allows rationality to rule by suppressing certain topics and historical grievances and excluding diverse languages of protest from public councils. Rawlsian model cannot make sense of and much less function within a setting of sharp conflicts, whether doctrinal, economic, political, or rhetorical even sharp cultural and religious diversity. Rawls’ theory maintains that if there are "unreasonable and irrational doctrines," the recommended response is to restrain them so that they do not destabilize the unity and justice of society. His "well-ordered society" also stipulates that "the most divisive issues, serious contentions which must undermine the basis of social cooperation" will be removed from the public agenda (1993: 157). According to Wolin (1996) "reasonable pluralism", which Rawls proposes, converts differences from a threat to an accomplice of stability, co-opting them so that in the end they are removed or absorbed into a consensus that requires smoothing off the rough, possibly irrational edges of differences. Some positions, he says, are just crazy and irrational, and those do not in themselves present a compelling case for accommodation. He seems to think that a society will have to exclude aims that are unreasonable. His model excludes groups which, according to Parekh (2000: 87), are many in number and include not only fascists, the racists and fundamentalists of different persuasion but also the sexists, conservative critics of liberal democracy and those with strong religious convictions.

Here, contra Kukathas, his theory cannot appeal to the accommodation of illiberal groups which are assimilated into the Rawlsian so-called rationality and well-order society. This does not consider the demands and the issues related to multiculturalism too seriously. His consensus allegedly rests on a moral conviction that is based not in a political or civic ideology but in the comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrines that each brings to political life. Now in the ground, Rawls theory is, I think, basically based on the principle of Toleration as Compromise. The plural society, which he depicts, is the one in which there is a group associated with the dominant perception of justice. This group has the majority. It has the power to impose its perception of the good life on the other groups which are minorities and less powerful. The majority hates some of the behaviors, beliefs and habits of the minorities. However, it tolerates those behaviors simply because controlling or assimilating them will trigger instability and will destroy the unity of the state which Rawls keeps that much dearer. Overlapping consensus is actually a sort of toleration based on compromise which the dominant group with power and dislike shows to the minorities. As he says that in their case the problem is to contain them so that they do not undermine the unity and justice of the society. Thus the majority tolerates the minorities, not because toleration is a virtue to be respected but as a compromise for the sake of unity ant stability of the state or more precisely for peaceful co-existence, or for the sake of justice.
II. John Raz and Pluralism: Modern western liberal society, according to Raz, is based on the idea of personal autonomy in the sense that its major social, economic and other institutions as well as inter-personal relations call for autonomous choices. Autonomy is an integral and extremely valued part of the individuals’ self-conceptions. If their choices are not their own, they feel alienated from their lives and lack a sense of integrity. It is not desired by them to opt for a different way of life and since all major institutions of society are based on individual choice, we can prosper in it only if we can be successfully autonomous (Raz, 1986: 369-70; 391; 394). Raz says that since the Asian or immigrants’ culture does not value autonomy, it is inferior and does not deserve any respect. It should be tolerated only if viable, does not harm outsiders and offers their members an adequate and satisfying life. Their members would not be able to lead a rewarding life. If these groups are unviable, survive only because of the pressure of their leaders and offer very little education or other opportunities to their children to thrive outside their community, they should be assimilated, by force if necessary.

However, in “Ethics in the public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics”, he made an accommodative approach toward minorities. Minority groups are now seen as an integral part of a multicultural society. The question is not how a liberal society should treat its minorities but how it can be truly multicultural and provide adequate space for them without undermining its own integrity (toleration as compromise). He now supports a society having different cultures which perform the roles of (i) making meaningful choices and (ii) necessary for human well-being. He now argues that since liberals value human well-being, they should also value cultural membership (1994: 177-9).

Here, as we will see in Mill case, emphasis is given on autonomy. The majority with power will tolerate the minority habits, customs and belief only if the minority values autonomy and well-being of the individual. Toleration is not valued independently but is seen as a mean to another value which is the autonomy of the individual—thus toleration as compromise.

III. John Stuart Mill: Mill also strongly supports individuality, the old version of autonomy. The need to be independent and different is, for Mill, the essence of human liberty, suggesting an extreme individualism. The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs (OL: 23-24). Again he mentions “A person whose desires and impulses are his own, are the expression of his own nature, as developed and modified by his own culture, is said to have a character. One whose desires and impulses are not his own, he has no character, no more than a steam-engine has a character. If, in addition to being his own, his impulses are strong, and are under the government of a strong will, he has an energetic character” (OL: 101).

Both Raz and Mill tolerate only those culture and minorities which value autonomy. They give emphasis on toleration in multicultural society, not as a virtue but as a compromise. The compromise is firstly, the resultant respect for one’s own autonomy when he respect the autonomy of other and secondly, welfare of the society as a whole. Here again, we can mention, the end result is peaceful co-existence. We respect people as self-developing beings who are able to develop their inherent faculties as they choose. At the same time, we insist on the requirement of mutuality. We ought to show respect for those who respect us. In valuing the autonomy, the suggestion is that we ought to allow others to act in ways they think morally acceptable, even if we think them morally repugnant, because they are under a similar obligation to give us the same freedom. The emphasis on the welfare of society can also be proved from this excerpt from On Liberty “This in proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others. There is a greater fullness of life about his own existence, and when there is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is composed of them” (OL:106).

IV. Bhikhu Parekh: Parekh’s solution for a multicultural society is that the constitution of such a state should be framed by consensus (emphasis added). The derivative (derived from its members) and primary collective rights derive their justification from contributing to the individual’s well-being (2000: 213-218). Primary collective rights may be individually or collectively exercised collective rights. Multicultural society needs a common culture (2000:219) which grows out of interaction of various cultures which respect the diversity and unite them around a common way of life. This common culture is maintained properly by a multiculturally oriented system of education (2000: 225-227). This should not be mono-cultural which restricts imaginations and produces arrogance. Education should expose students to different conceptions of good life.
It should be education in freedom; freedom from ethnocentric prejudices and biases and freedom to explore and learn from other cultures. Again, multicultural society must have a national identity (2000: 235-237) to cultivate a common sense of belonging among its diverse communities. This should be located in political and not ethnocultural structure. National identity should allow for multiple (cultural) identities, should not consider the minorities as outsiders, and respect and accept them equally valuable (though the definition of national identity will not be culturally neutral). He supports some sort of affirmative action.

The relations between majority and minorities should be adjusted on the basis of Operative Public Values (OPV) embodied in the state’s constitutional, legal and civic institutions and practices regulating the conducts of the citizens. These values are not coherent and static but changing and are sometimes subjected to opposite interpretations. The OPV should be reassessed periodically so as to provide a chance to minorities to adjust their practices to it. The OPV should be justified and the rejection of the minority culture should be explained. On the other hand, minority should also justify its practices. The dialogue should focus on the both; the majority and minority values. If the minority defends its disputed practice, the practice should be allowed if not the OPV will prevail (2000, 269-273).

Now putting his argument for multicultural society, Parekh is also pleading for toleration on the part of majority toward minorities. The majority is powerful and can restrain the hated behaviors and beliefs of the minorities, but does not do it for the sake of stability and order of the society and peaceful co-existence as he says (2000: 207) that “peace is the first desideratum in every society, particularly the multicultural, whose tendency to provoke acute conflicts is further compounded by its inability to rely on a shared body of values to moderate and regulate them. At all cost a multicultural society must find ways of holding itself together long enough to enable its different communities to become used to each other and build up common interests and mutual trust”. Now here toleration is not valued as virtue but is applied to gain something else-unity, order and peaceful co-existence.

V. Will Kymlicka: Kymlicka’s treatment of minorities is based on three propositions namely: human beings have an essential interest in leading a good life; that individual should be ordered from within and; individual’s ends and projects should be revisable. He argues that individual freedom is tied in some important way to membership in one's national group (1995: 52) that is why he bases his theory on “Societal Culture” which he defines as:

A culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated, and based on a shared language (1995: 76).

For Kymlicka it is the societal culture which not only gives full autonomy (the autonomy to make reasonable choice) to our life but also a full perfection and perception of good life.

According to Kymlicka, liberalism is committed to (perhaps even defined by) the view that individuals should have the freedom and capacity to question and possibly revise the traditional practices of their community, if they come to see them as no longer worthy of their allegiance (1995: 152). Now if this is the case and certain groups of the society does not provide such type of right to its members, then the groups concerned be liberalized. If this interpretation is taken it would apply that the larger society will impose its view of the perception of good life on the illiberal groups which will be equivalent to imposing of a comprehensive view on the minorities. Kymlicka says that the minorities will put forward two types of demands (i) Internal restriction which will empower the group to suppress internal dissent and will violate the liberty and freedom of its members, and (ii) External protection which reduces minority vulnerability to the decision of the large society. However, this will not be a mean for a group to oppress and exploit other groups. Thus a liberal view requires freedom within the minority group and equality between the minority groups. Liberal principle, according to Kymlicka supports the second demand but not the first one.

He (1995: 27-33) specifies three group-specific rights (i) Self-government right: The right of self-determination (UN). But UN gives it to colonies and not internal national minorities. This may be achieved by federalism (and redrawing boundaries) or reserved land (tribal and band reservation). However, in some states federalism is not connected with accommodating the self-government rights (US).
Federalism guarantees self-government rights only if the minority form majority in the unit. (ii) Polyethnic rights: An exemption from laws and regulations that disadvantage immigrants in term of religion etc. (iii) Special representation right: Proportional representation and making political parties more inclusive to rectify systemic disadvantages.

Kymlicka says that there are two claims which provide a liberal defense of the minority rights (i) that individual freedom is tied up in some important ways to membership in one’s national group and (ii) that group-specific rights can promote equality between the majority and minority (1995: 167). He also says that we have two preconditions of leading a good life (i) we lead our life from the inside in accordance with our beliefs; and (ii) we be free to question those beliefs, to examine in light of whatever information, examples and arguments our culture can provide (1995: 81).

Kymlicka’s thesis is that individual should be tolerated to question and revise traditions of his group. If the term revision is taken in its broader sense, then it might mean the freedom to exit from the group in which case Kymlicka comes very closer to Kukathas and the basis of their theories become the same. However, Kymlicka’s concept of toleration is different from that of Kukathas in that Kukathas mentions tolerance for illiberal groups if they have no support from the state but Kymlicka’s tolerance is linked with the autonomy of the individual to question and revise his existing ends. Kymlicka’s theory is inhospitable with treatment of illiberal groups or minorities within the state and says that the liberal must do something to liberalize the illiberal societies. However, he is against the coercive methods used for the liberalization of those groups (1995: 167).

Now Kymlicka’s theory can also be seen as based on toleration as compromise. He mentions three types of rights for minorities (self-government, poly-ethnic and special representation). The majority is in the powerful position and can deny these rights. Again, some of the minority’s habits and behavior are hated by the majority. But even then, in his theory, the majority offers these rights to the minority (toleration). However, this is not because toleration is valued as virtue but for the sake of another value which is stability, order and peaceful co-existence as he says that the demand for representation of a group is the demand for inclusion (1995: 174-176). Similarly, polyethnic rights (for Sikh to wear turban while in the police force and Jew to wear yarmulka while in military service) are integrative (1995: 176-181). He says that there is little evidence to show that immigrants pose any threat to the integrity of the state. Recent survey shows that granting self-governing rights decreases the chances of conflict while refusing it escalates conflicts (1995: 185). All these statements show that for him stability is more important than toleration as a virtue.

VI. Chandran Kukathas: Kukathas depicts a vision of a free society as an open society with the principles admitting not fixed but a variability of human arrangements along with the freedom of association and mutual toleration of association. The principles of a free society are not based on the hierarchy of superior and subordinate authorities, but should depict an archipelago of competing and overlapping jurisdictions. In a free society there will be a variety of authorities, each independent of the others, and maintained by the consent of its subjects. A liberal society, according to him, is marked by respect for the independence of other authorities, and a reluctance to interfere in their affairs. His theory denies two things (i) that any particular group or class or community should be given special recognition; and (ii) that there is any authoritative standpoint from which such recognition may ultimately be granted. In such a free society there may be many associations, but in which none is privileged; equally, there may be many authorities (2003: 4). The theory of the free society is, therefore, an account of the terms by which different ways coexist rather than an account of the terms by which they cohere (2003: 5).

As against Kymlicka who says that the liberal state should promote the integration of groups into the mainstream culture (through its policies on language, education, and citizenship more generally), and specify the principles which should guide policy-making, Kukathas does not see cultural integration to be the purpose of the state, and rejects the idea of making the boundaries, the symbols, and the cultural character of the state matters of justice. He advocates the principle of “benign neglect”. Kukathas mentions that a free society is not a stable social unity by a shared doctrine. It is a collection of communities and authorities (all authority resting in the end on the acquiescence of subjects rather than on justice) associated under laws which recognize the freedom of individuals to associate as, and with whom, they wish (2003: 19).
For Kukathas the basic value of liberalism is toleration. The greater the extent to which an association tolerates difference, the more it is a liberal association; and the greater the extent to which it suppresses dissent, the less it is a liberal association (2003: 24). Toleration is required because, for Kukathas, it guarantees the freedom of conscience which is at the heart of his theory as he says “it is the value of liberty of conscience which lies at the core of the liberal ideal of toleration. In this regard, a society is a liberal one if individuals are at liberty to reject the authority of one association in order to place themselves under the authority of another; and to the extent that individuals are at liberty to repudiate the authority of the wider society in placing themselves under the authority of some other association” (2003: 25).

The fundamental principle describing a free society, according to Kukathas, is the principle of freedom of association and dissociation which is important because it upholds liberty of conscience. This is a society in which difference and dissent are tolerated. This means that the people should not be required to live in or be a part of ways they think wrong, or to participate in practices which they cannot abide morally. People should be free to live as conscience commands (2003: 94). A second outcome is the principle of mutual toleration of associations. Indeed, a society is free to the extent that it is prepared to tolerate associations which differ or dissent from its standards or practices (2003: 75).

Now looking to Kukathas’ theory, one can easily form the opinion that his theory is based on toleration. It is the toleration of illiberal minorities whose behaviors and customs are hated by the majority. The majority has the power to control the minorities’ hated behaviors but do not use coercion for the sake of toleration. Though he does not support compromise since it violates the dictate of conscience (2003: 133), there are statements which shows the glimpses of compromise in his theory as he says that if we are convinced beyond doubt of the correctness of our beliefs or about the immorality of the practices of others, there is less reason to tolerate those whose beliefs or practices differ from our own. Yet if there is any possibility of doubt or uncertainty about the correctness or reliability of our judgment, then there is some reason to tolerate them. It is in recognition of our own fallibility that we are inclined to tolerate what we think is mistaken (2003: 165). This seems to give toleration a purely instrumental value: toleration is a means to some other end. We tolerate others’ beliefs because we are not sure of the correctness of our own. We tolerate their’s and want them to tolerate our’s-toleration as compromise. Again he says that the dominant culture should not intervene in the domain of illiberal culture and should adopt toleration in cases where there is clear evidence of terrible practices. First, persuasion is always preferable to force, morally speaking, so it would be better to allow the effects of interaction between peoples and communities of different moral outlook to work towards the elimination of dubious customs (2003: 180). Here he pleads toleration for the sake of elimination of bad and the prevalence of true customs and beliefs-toleration as compromise.

5. Limits to Toleration

While summarizing the essentials of toleration, I mentioned that there must be some limits to toleration. As in compromise there is always a base line below which a party cannot go; because going below that point is hazardous to his position, so while applying toleration there are some limits which we cannot cross. For example the practice of murder for family honor that is employed by some cultural communities in Pakistan, most notably in Pakhtun areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Israel, most notably in the Bedouin and Druze communities, sometimes also in the Christian community is a practice which is beyond the domain of toleration. On most occasions its victims are women perceived to be “misbehaving”. In these communities, frequently honor is more important than life, and culture more important than law. Women are assassinated because they were accused of not conforming to prevailing moral codes. Violation of the sexual norm by a married woman automatically calls for her murder. As for single women, accusation is always based on the breach of the norm that a girl or unmarried woman who has “sinned” must be punished by death unless she marries the partner in intercourse.

Some norms are considered by liberal standards to be intrinsically wrong, wrong by their very nature. Such are norms that result in physical harm to women and babies like widow burning, female infanticide, harsh forms of female circumcision and murder for family honor because they are other-regarding acts rather than self-regarding. Toleration based on respect for autonomy, skepticism, prudence and conscience and respect for other must be counterbalanced by the Millian harm principle.
For Mill, (OL: 18-19)) the end for which “mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection”. Power can be rightfully exercised over any member of society, against her will, is to prevent harm to others. The upholding of the Respect for Others Argument and the Harm Principle in toleration safeguards the rights of those who might find themselves in a disadvantageous position in society, such as women; ethnic, religious, national and cultural minorities; homosexuals; and others.

Based on the above arguments toleration of Headscarf is justified because the right to wear religious symbols in public places is an expression of religious freedom and, therefore, is compatible with the rules of a secular liberal democracy. If many see the wearing of the Muslim head-scarf as an act of proselytism, it will severely question the role of advertisement which is the essence of modern economic life. Even if it is seen as symbols of the subordination of Muslim women, and questioning the ideal of equality between sexes, most of the women have voluntarily and by their own free will, without any pressure or intimidation from their parents started using headscarves. According to the liberal principles, most importantly the principle of autonomy, they have every right to act autonomously. It is their free-chosen project and as long as they do not harm other, they should not be interfered with. Again, the public sphere is not always neutral nor could it be purely secularized to use Galeotti (2002: 124) phrase.

Thus the point of liberal algebra in the form of compossibility and adequacy as explained by Waldron (2003) is to explain the wrongness (and hence the legitimate excludability) of things like murder, rape, assault, fraud, and non-consensual sadism. The prohibition of such actions is supposed to be explained and justified in virtue of their being comprised in any set of constraints that satisfies adequacy and compossibility.

6. Conclusion

Modern societies cannot deny their multicultural status which is positive and factual. Peace, stability and peaceful co-existence demand a rational, effective and pragmatic approach to the problems of diversity. Rational thinking avoids comprehensive liberalism as a solution to the problems of plurality; rather it prefers political liberalism as a solution and that is too the Kukathasian version of liberalism. The foregoing discussion is an attempt to prove and justify that it is toleration which is a rational and pragmatic approach to the problems of multicultural society. It is really a mean in multiculturalism. The study also emphasizes on the fact that it is toleration which is the base of every political theory applied to the fact of pluralism. In every theory, whether it is of John Rawls, John Raz, John Stuart Mill, Parekh, Will Kymlicka or Chandran Kukathas and a number of others, there is a powerful majority which abhors the abnormal customs, habits and beliefs of the minorities. The normal is defined by the majority. If we change the context and environment the normal becomes abnormal and vice versa. The majority has the power to restrain the hateful customs and beliefs of the minorities but for the sake of toleration. Again, toleration is not valued as virtue in itself. It is not considered as an end but a mean towards the attainment of another end which might vary from peaceful co-existence, order and stability to reward and some other short and long term benefits. This means that toleration is applied as a compromise formula-toleration as compromise.

However, as in compromise we cannot go below a given base line so while applying toleration we cannot say right to each and every custom, belief or action of minorities. Peace, order and stability and also toleration when valued as virtue as outcomes of toleration must be counterbalance by the Mill’s harm principle and basic rights of others. Murder, fraud, killing for honor, racism and a number of other irrational an unjustified beliefs and actions must not be the object of toleration.

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