Amidst the Aspiration versus Exposition of “Rational-Actual” Dichotomy versus Unity In Hegelian Terminology

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşen Furtun
Kirikkale University
Law Faculty
Turkey

1. Is Morality Possible or an Illusion when Human-beings are concerned in regards “Abstract Right” and “Morality”?

i. The Core/Nucleus of Hegelian Thought in Fichte

In its ancient roots understanding of human nature as for instance expounded in the theory of Aristotle led to a view of morality such as virtue ethics with a definitive goal of happiness set for this (human) nature and thus its (humans) search for fulfillment through the capacity of the Soul to be actualised appropriately_giving meaning to its existence. Thus in its appropriatization human potential and nature required practical wisdom as an intellectual virtue as well as virtue as a human characteristic trait to be harmonised in the faculty of Reason versus human desires, likes and dislikes, pain and pleasure etc derived from the External Universe. Further within the sphere of External Universe certain stimuli regarding human conduct were in close competition versus the common goal set by inner stimulus, inner feeling of morality inherent to “humanity” at least in regards Aristotelian theory.(cf. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 2:222-224, 204-206, Elements of Philosophy of Right, pr.150, Phenomenology of Spirit, pr.444-476, 599-671)

Yet on the other hand modern understanding of the very existence concerning human-beings -as an anti-thesis to the former theretic version_inquired deliberately into the “value/worth” of this common goal/end once supposed to be common within theoretical frame-work and thus questioned from whence it derived its philosophical legitimacy since for instance according to the expounder of this opponent theory namely I.Kant “the value of any end depends upon its being set as an end by a rational will which presupposes a process of rational deliberation from principles”(cf. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, IV:412). Thus Kant founded ethics on an imperative universally valid for all rational beings and self-legislated by each rational being” in the form of a categorical imperative saying so act that you can will the maxim of your action to be a universal law.(cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.117-119, 129-133)

Hence it can be statedthat the categorical understanding of the imperative here doesn’t leave any room for the hypothetical version i.e. based on the desires/human inclinations for any end/or even a common end/goal previously set even by the rational will –such as that of happiness/virtue since from a questioning i.e. philosophical point of view the value of any individual’s happiness is only conditional on that individual’s possessing a good will which conditions even the worthiness to be happy.(cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.135)Thus in Kantian terms happiness is said to be objectively valuable only because it is an end set by a rational will.(cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.148)Further as a conclusion we can say that the External World conditions human behaviour either in regards its particular objects of desire or through the faculty of Reason harmonising these external stimuli within the human capacity of its actualisation appropriate to its nature i.e. virtue of morality or happiness.

Yet along the lines of moral theory through this modern version for instance through the theory/stand-point of the original follower of Kant_namely Fichte such hypothetical emperatives’ conditioning through is not understood to be condemned and rejected versus a categorical rational will requiring the maxim of the action to be universal_hence the faculty of Reason according to Fichte requiring thus not only a “self-refuting” process that of hypothetical versus categorical but also a “self-confirming” plying process as well _(cf. Wood, Hegel’s ethics, 213-214, 216-217, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.4, 34-36, 41)hence Reason as a faculty unifying with the subject bearing it as an “I” as a person at the initial stage “resist”ing the “External World” and its variant stimuli_shaping human inclination toward behaviour (variously) such as pain/pleasure, likes/dislikes etc.

280
and then in the second stage (Reason) “reflect”ing on the object in a “different” way than that of put forward by Kant such as not that of mere rejection but parallel to the ancient understanding that of Aristotle (reflecting on it i.e. the object of external World) in an harmonious way thus “subordinating” it to itself through the process of mutual interaction with the object and itself.

Yet it can be stated that according to Fichte the expounding of the concept of “I”_ different than Kant_ against to the(similar) pattern of universal categorical imperative there is/can be no categorical universal being/or I (even within the same process of being against/versus the external world as mentioned above) duplicating itself each and every time in the implication(s) of the imperative such as dictated. Thus for Fichte for each and every “I”_bearing Faculty of Reason in its person there is also another self or I, resisting the External World as well as itself, yet on the other hand “recognising” the very action of “itself”_ such as “reflective awareness”_ and the harmonisation of “resistance” and thus defining itself _its self identity via the recognition of the “I” such as “not-I” through the co-ordination of mutuality.(cf.Fichte, System der Sittenlehre, pr.4, 156, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.22, 23, 29, 149, Phenomenology of Spirit, pr.18)

Thus in this regard the process of recognition of not-I of the reflective awareness of I through resistance and harmonisation can be considered as the categorical element in the Faculty of Reason versus its counter-hypothetical part in resistance and reflection yet finding unison/unity by self-definition in the form of a body or property _yet different than the object of the external world_ thus meaning each individual’s being faced by hypothetical imperatives “Having a Right to a portion” i.e. categorical part of the External World_ within the foundation of this Reasoning Process.(cf.Wood, Hegel’s ethics, 220, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.41, Phenomenology of Spirit, pr.178-196, Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, pr.433-436)

Thus for Fichte “the individual’s journey of becoming a whole (i.e. that of categorical element together with hypothetical elements in the plying process of faculty of Reason) and a determinate “I” i.e. resisting the object yet finding harmony _includes unification with others defining one-self within a harmonious social whole. As a result according to Fichte “ next to the real World i.e. external world of objects the striving of the “I” ( i.e. reflective awareness on the hypothetical) produces an entire Ideal World i.e. that of recognition of the “not-I”_ of “ought to be”_i.e. (of) categorical, free rational autonomous activity of Reason that can only be fulfilled in and through a certain form of society through mutual co-ordination and unification of I and not-I both categorically and hypothetically.(cf.Westphal, Hegel’s Epistemological Realism, 166, 169, 172, Philosophy of Mind, pr.145, 163, 167)

**ii. Human Conduct on Hegelian Terms**

Thus else than this version of the unison of elements of both categorical and hypothetical_for Fichte “Kantian categorical imperative is empty and does not differentiate between irrational and rational maxims.”(cf. Wood, The Emptiness of the Moral Will, 454-483, Hegel’s ethics, 223, Phenomenology of Spirit, pr.632, 671, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.148, 138) Yet on the other hand it can also be stated that else than the guidingoutlook of the theory of Aristotelian moralitvmore actualisation and harmonisation of human capacity in regards a certain/or any of that end/s as that of resistance toward the external world would not suffice either.

Thus according to Fichte on the one hand “I” resisting the object/s of the external world consequently subordinates the object to itself:“I” through “reflective awareness” whereas on the other hand “not-I” bears within the “equal right” of all “I”s (as mentioned above) in mutual co-ordination such as “I” and “not-I” reciprocally_ to have an appropriate portion of the External World_ i.e. objects in regards both “body and property” through “recognition” in the ideal World of a society.

Yet following further through this path according to a ground-breaking expounder of the moral i.e.ethical theory W.F. Hegel surpassing this process of “recognition” there also is/can be “resistance” amongst the “not-I”s as well,(not recognised by Fichte) thus meaning “recognition” i.e. “morality” in his own terms not being enough for compounding the ideal World of a (mentioned) society.(cf. Faith and Knowledge, pr.426/183) Therefore in regards Hegelian theory the “resistance” among “not-I”s means that “recognition” is not/cannot be easily accomplished “formally”(either) i.e. similar to the criticisms mentioned above (in i) as that of the required unison of elements of Faculty of Reason both categorically and hypothetically.
Thus in regards Hegelian theory the “recognition” bears yet another level of resistance within itself among “I”’s and “not-I”’s reciprocally before reaching unison meaning conflict and resistance in the supposed to be ideal society/World of Fichtean theory and unison at the “final” stage of recognition being not be easily i.e. formally achieved and implemented requiring another ideal/compound stage as that of “State” in Hegelian terminology versus mere “civil society” equivalent to Fichtean morality present in the ideal world of a “society” i.e. civil society through the process of mutual “recognition and co-ordination” else than mere reflective awareness there upon.(cf. Wood, Hegel’s ethics, 227, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.147, 14)

Thus in Hegelian terminology else than the relation of “abstract right” in regards property in the moral yet abstract sphere of morality similar to Kantian noumenal realm paralleling Fichtean mutual process of recognition among “I”’s and “not-I”’s reciprocally there is yet a compound realm to be discovered and further implemented via the unison of both categorical and hypothetical in the form of an ideal yet rational “State” i.e. “The State” to be actualised in harmonious recognition and co-ordination else than mere self-reflection upon the objects and further “delimited” subjects” without having mutual awareness and recognition of each other _naturally resulting in conflict and resistance before reaching unison of a bi-lateral and further multilateral relations of a phenomenal sphere of social structure and contexture of a mere formalone-to-one abstracted encountering process.

Thus in Hegelian terminology transcending the Subjective Spirit i.e. equivalent to that of the process of mutual recognition in the personhood of “I” and “not-I” at another relevant stage of “ethical life” versus mere “morality” Objective Spirit comes into existence synthetically bearing an ideal state i.e. that of “The State” essentially.(cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.258)

Thus Hegel can be said to have recognised this insufficient formal understanding of the “personhood” of the “I” and “not-I” which bears within (say)not one unique “CategoricalBeing” duplicating itself similarly once recognition i.e. morality is supposed to be/have been reached within the ideal world that of “civilsociety” but the presence of particular personhoods/selves yet resisting “other”personhoods/selves (although being entitled to an appropriate portion of the external World reciprocally through the process of supposed mutual co-ordination) rather than in regards the object of the external world in the initial stage of the process of reflective awareness resulting in “sub-ordination” rather than supposed to be formal categorical co-ordination and recognition yet at another level “within” the so-called ideal world of a (civil) society bearing recognition of morality. (cf. Wood, Hegel’s ethics, 213, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.34-36, 41, 115-120)

Therefore in regards Hegelian theory it is essential that recognition in this rejected stage (that of personhood/self evolving into identity) should take into consideration not merely the concept of “AbstractRight” in regards an appropriate portion of the property (and body) such as that of recognition of the Right to life and liberty but also the “Right of appropriate recognition” for the “moral” self to develop its “identity” not to be reached within the morality of the civil society but in the ethical/ideal life of the community with its institutional contextual structure upon the unity of the State_(in regards its eternal Constitution yet being open to change to be explored in the second part-ii of our inquiry) rather than the concept of mere personhood in the noumenal realm of morality in Kantian terminology.(cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.33, 23, 149, Phenomenology of Spirit, pr.18)

Hence resisting “identities” were presentsub-ordinatively before reaching unity in the ethical/ideal life of the society institutionalised upon the ideal of the “State” whereby as an institutional instrument designed for this purposed recognising such identities “appropriately” in unison synthetically were made possible considering both formal categorical self:and not-I’s in their particularity reaching beyond the out-look of mere moral selves similar to that of Aristotelian theory in harmony. Thus such resisting identities “reject”ed one another as “I”’s and “not-I”’s mutually yet notas in the rejection of an object which can not resist back but “randomly” and “reciprocally” since rejection being at this stage counter-effective from both sides of the “I”’s and “not-I”’s making it impossible to define “who” rejects “who” rather than who rejects what straight forwardly in one direction meaning and requiring “appropriate” recognition of and on both sides of the “I”’s and “not-I”’s counter-clock wise and reciprocally. Thus resisting identities today bear within not only loss of life i.e. death and property due to lack of sufficient appropriate recognition as Fichte missed and Hegel put forward but also loss of dignity such as rejection, humiliation, degradation, discrimination, mobbing and even (religious) tyranny i.e. in the variant forms of “sub-ordination” through rejecting one another requiring not only mere formal mutual reciprocity to be recognised morally in the form of a civil moral society but also a substantial ethical life bearing within appropriate recognition to its variant differentiations/existence in the form of an ideal State put forward conceptually by the Hegelian theory.

282
2. In regards “Ethical Life” _A Better Choice(Possible)? for the Foundation of Human Society: Rational versus Organic Conceptions of Society in regards Hegelian Theory

Thus (it can be said that, as explored above) Hegelian basic tenet_ “What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational” (cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.342-343, 345-346) in regards human reasoning in the exposition of the Free Will as an intellectual and rational faculty explores achieving its freedom both by legislating the fundamental end of human action in parallel to Kantian thought yet also by recognising assessing and revising its own rationality as the basis of principles/standards of action as “social practices” in its actualisation institutionally. (cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.4-7, 9, 19)

Thus for Hegel in this regard there can be no such pure rational motive as Kantian respect for law since human_intended_action as a motive can/does have various ends always together with a general end of achieving its freedom (cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.7, 10, 22, 23, 28, 39) so that the distinction between existence and actuality according to Hegelian thought would expound the Universe’s rational structure progressively actualising itself institutionally within a social contexture drawn designed and defined rationally by the individual Acts of Will providing and securing for their autonomy yet different than Kantian theory “interdependently” but not to be mistaken conceptually and contrasted by “natural and social heteronomy” bearing within naturally given inclinations (psychologically) determining the action i.e. out-side the sphere of its Free Nature of Will _yet to be explored rather as a self-knowledge and attitude of the individual response to circumstance as would be required of a social-practitioner (cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.27, 261, 4, 29, 30) versus a mere moral agent (cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.104, 107, 132, 117, 121) taking social practices of his own antecedent and of his fellows’ into consideration and also criticising assessing and revising them rationally as well within the social context bearing responsibility of both intended and fore-seen consequences of the (certain) action and also mutual counter-actions in regards one another mutually and further independently. (cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr. 140, 118, 120, 132)

Thus in sum in regards Hegelian thought else than the Kantian out-look of the Will of Free Action achieving its freedom rationally (i.e. also categorically) (cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.21, 258, 133, 124, 13) it can be asserted that “the Content of the Will (thus) derives from Nature but transforms itself into a self-givencontent within a self-drawn social context”. (cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr. 13, 21, 211, Westphal, The Basic Context and Structure of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, pp. 236, 245, 254-255) Thus in this regard Hegel held that “individuals are fundamentally social practitioners” else than being mere moral agents and what individuals do in regards their free will of action seeking personal autonomy and freedom bears an individual response to the social context within which the so-called basic end of human life and action would be actualised defined assessed and revised in order to be rationalised.

Therefore in Hegelian thought in contra-argument to conservatist and organic conceptions of society it can be asserted that the non-rational components of human nature can not be regarded as the foundation of the society despite the sceptical rejection of human ability to comprehend society rationally and to much less reconstruct it rationally. (cf. Westphal, pp.236-237) Thus as for Hegel as well as Kant human rationality is the key to autonomy and to self-determination both individually (i.e. conceptually) and socially (i.e. institutionally). (cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.135) Thus Hegel firmly believed in historical progress as a rational process as in his basic tenet of “rational-actual” realisation of the Free Will within a self-drawn social contexture interdependently.

Thus it can also be asserted that on this basis laws or principles of justice do not restrict individual freedom of action in return for security and peaceful co-existence(c.f. for criticisms of the natural law theory, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.29, 75, 100, 258, 281) but actually “enable” conditions for a wide range of aspects of character development and individual action as social practices expounded mutually in the Free Acts of social practitioners interdependently. (cf. Westphal, p.242)

Thus on Hegelian account the most basic end of the human will to act freely generates commitment to this basic end through principles practices institutions to be obeyed and observed via legal authority as social practices (cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, preface 24-26/20-22, pr.31, 189) to be made known and to be regularised as well as justifying them in regards rights of the individuals and further citizens to be acknowledged by the Public Authority as will be explored below _even when at instances of unforeseen hindrances and accidents to secure rationality as a necessary and legitimate means of conditional versus phenomenal contingency_ (cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.230-233, 235) henceforth restricting an unavoidable heteronomy and returning to human life and autonomy bearing within Freedom of the Will.
Thus it can be stated that the social elaboration of needs transforms those needs from a natural level of mere givenness to a social level indicating that humans come to give themselves their own needs versus being passively bound by (natural) external inclinations of a given Nature upon which they have no autonomy and further initiative to react upon else than the already morally drawn/given expected reaction of them i.e. rather the reaction that they are faced with automatically externally_even out of their individual and further social character as rational free human-beings with a rational free will of action i.e. rational capacity.

Therefore in Hegelian terms we can conclude that freedom isn’t simply actual(cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.106)_ i.e. it doesn’t exist without the free voluntary action of moral subject to be realised in regards the embodiment of the institutions of the civil society. (cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.188, 187, 193, 194)Yet reasoning with correct moral principles is essential (cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.140, Westphal, p.247) as regarded to be shed upon in the process of embodiment whereas abstraction is in concern_in regards Hegelian dialectical process of thinking exploring expounding at levels of understanding to be complemented with each other dialectically (i.e. interdependently) in the unity/whole of the civil society_yet again to be abstracted in the mechanism of the State (i.e. the ideal State to be actualised in Hegelian terms) i.e. central government through the institutions of administration of justice, public authority and corporations.(cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.208, 210, 218, 219) Thus in Hegelian thought the Universe’s rational structure progressively actualises itself and social institutions aspire and tend to achieve a fundamentally rational form.(cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.266, 257-271, Westphal, p.260)

Yet the problem today as perhaps stated in the criticisms of the Hegelian theory is that the mentioned abstraction process as to be shed upon institutions as Hegel has expounded it to be (actually) has not been embodied in the relevant institutions of the ethical life of the modern society/societies as Hegel has fore-seen it to be/have been(cf. Westphal, p.263, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.342-343, 345-346)meaning that Freedom has/is not been actualised in regards rationality of both moral subjects and ethical institutions (as well) in regards Hegelian theory. Yet on the on-set of the correct apprehension of such criticisms and the theory itself one should of course keep in mind that_in regards relative arguments whether Hegel propounded liberalism, conservatism or even organicism of his age_(cf. Westphal, Hegel’s Epistemological Realism, pp.166, 169-172)Hegel distinguished between phenomena that embodied a rational structure and those that did not (cf. Westphal, p.234) and on Hegel’s view that a state existed did not mean that it either entailed rationality or even for that reason actuality just forthe sake of its mere existence-say as a misapprehension of the Hegelian basic tenet of the “rational-actual” equivalence as mentioned above.

Thus Hegel denied organic conceptions of (individual and) society which kept individuals within the barriers of their own society_not being able to escape from it at all since it had formed their identities and thus being incapable of evaluating the imprisoning society by pre-or-non social standards and principles of their once present now captured autonomous Free Will of Action. Thus in Hegelian terms defending autonomy of the Free Will of the independent individual requires showing how individuals are self-legislators i.e how they give themselves their own principles, aims and objects of the Will i.e. bearing/meaning the Content of the Will.(cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.9)But Hegel also argued that the free rational spontaneous human will can not generate or specify its own principles, aims or objects a priori either.(cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.258)Thus as stated above the Content of the Will derives from Nature but transforms itself into a self-given content_socially acknowledged and assessed.

Thus amidst the dichotomy of organic concept/ion of society versus/and independent individuals taking precedence and defining over one another Hegel denied the disparition as a false dichotomy and briefly held individuals as fundamentally social practitioners learning, participating, perpetrating in and if needed modifying, revisiting and reassessing social practices as regards their changing needs and circumstances (as acknowledged).Therefore in regards Hegelian theory it can be stated that social practices can not occur without social practitioners.i.e. being further than moral agents who believe in accordance with social practices and who understand themselves and others as engaging in those practices.(cf. Westphal, p.254)

Thus “what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational” as an Hegelian dictum or basic tenet is not to be acknowledged as a blanket endorsement of extant institutions and thus the aspiration for the Freedom of Thought in this perspective is never to be finally accomplished in any stage of human rational faculty developing progressively as long as human life and history in regards its exponents survives its being existentially.
i. In Between “Rational_Actual” and “Regular_Social”: Regularisation of social phenomena institutionally in regards Hegelian Theory

Thus as we have studied in the previous section Hegel considers inclinations as well as anthropological phenomena as “social practices” of individual human action to be taken into account further thus for instance for the responsibility of the action to be beared upon both with intended and additionally with (rationally) anticipated consequences (as well) but requires them to be “regularised” even at the risk of being mis-conceptionally considered a conservatist thus favouring status quo just for the sake of mentioned regularisation process.

As well as these instances Hegel transforms Kantian categorical imperative into self-given ends as mentioned above together with phenomenal back-ground of rational apprehension yet also being embodied substantially in detail as to be foreseen with its implications at certain circumstances and stances as well. Thus for instance in regards the process of administration of justice taking place in the ethical life of civil society laws must be determinate in order to be apprehended by the individuals for the guidance of their actions(cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.299, 132, 209-212, 215) yet still within the sphere of their individual freedom and autonomy. Thus the rules, legal principles and the structure of the society is being affirmed by the individual selves before being put into practice as social and legal practices and procedures of their community bearing within the “regularisation” and exercise of the action within the social contexture.

Thus where the security of the Free Action implementing/bearing the rational autonomy of the moral agent may be at stake as in the instances of unforeseen hindrances and accidents at the institutionalised actualisation process in regards Hegelian theory “The Public Authority” (cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.230-233, 235) is specifically designed and devised as an instrument to remove and remedy such accidental hindrances so that the free individual action would not be impaired and disrupted. Thus the devised conceptual abstraction isto be embodied this time institutionally as/versus being expounded and apprehended by the moral agent himself yet in the ethical life of both his (the moral agent’s) individual being together with his fellow moral agents brought together socially and communally and regarded this time as citizens to support for each other’s (personal-individual and) rational autonomy in regards Freedom of their Wills yet interdependently in its process to be actualised rationally_which can only be possible within a conceptual frame-work yet to be embodied structurally within a rational society called one’s community and further the civil society and the central government and bearing all these elements together within a unified whole i.e. The State.(cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.257-271)

Thus the State is in Hegelian terms an eternal rational conceptual structure(cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.273) yet subject to change (cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.298) with in epistemological expounding yet rationality being secured conceptually through time momentum i.e. eternally so that historical contingency would not occur arbitrarily rather than a rational process of gradual collective revision to achieve and preserve/secure_as the basic tenet_personal autonomy and freedom of the individual. Thus reform i.e. actualisation at developing stages would be a rational i.e. deliberate on-going process versus an arbitrary contingency of phenomenal (out-comes) existences such as that of revolution, social up-takes and up-heavals etc.

Thus even in this regard Hegel mentions the important role of the “Estates Assembly”(cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.287, 301, 302) in parallel to the role of Public Authority favoured and designed as an intermediate institutional means for the process of legislative mechanism despite the criticisms of contra-argument in regards Hegelian theory in regards its claims that democratic election via democratic rule rests too much on political sentiment and that open elections encourage people to vote on the basis of their apparent particular interests at the expense of the community (cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right pr.273, 281, 301, 303, 253) yet in Hegelian terms which should be understood as the rational community securing individual autonomy even from the out-bursts and violations of the individual self-seeking despite the individual himself in his irrational ignorance thus shaped when left outside the structure and guidance of the (State of) rational society.

Thus Hegel favours in this regard expert knowledge for legislation(cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.301) versus personal ignorance in parallel to social unapprehended hindrances as mentioned above and that the laws being formulated by experts i.e. ministers before being enacted by the Crown i.e. the Princely power.(cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.275, 283, 284)
Therefore the Estates Assembly with its bi-cameral structure brings popular insight and purview for the legislation process via the representatives of the Corporations and the land-owners (cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.288, 311, 307) by providing information for the members, citizens systematically and thoroughly about the activities of their government so that the individuals would be able to act voluntarily and autonomously within their society.

Yet even in this structural organisation for instance there may be counter issues of cases similar to that of Weberian criticisms (cf. Westphal, p.263) such as that of irresponsible autonomous bureaucracy in parallel to unenlightened individual interest as mentioned above yet this time blinded by too much special technicality abstracted from the social reality bearing its own rationality within yet to be kept at hand to be provided as remedy at such similar cases of hindrances institutionally as well.

Thus although Hegel may be said to have opposed standard democratic procedures as we know of them today in historical circumstances of the/this age, nevertheless beyond the considerations of any age he maybe considered a firm republican and to have taken informed body politic and universal participation more seriously at a much deeper institutional level than we might ever know today as in any modern democracy/ies of 21st century of human existence in its contingency.

Thus even the institutional medium of Corporations (cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, pr.252, 253, 244) in the ethical life of the society in this regard can be said to be designed to ensure that complex far-flung economic factors would not uncomprehendedly sway over people’s activities and lives in order not to limit their freedom and activity in their vocational field of interest thus a Corporation working as a trade-association bearing full membership of all its participants in the relevant sector of economy to provide their work employment and integration into the sector and to enlighten them so that possible business fluctuations on the members would be moderated upon as in the other fields for instance as that of provided by Public Authority in regards social fields of development as that of education, health etc and also/even as that of provided by the Estates Assembly in regards legislation i.e. that of formal and abstract law-making.

Thus we can conclude that in regards Hegelian theory the fluctuations of irregular i.e. irrational arbitrary social phenomena would be “regularised” upon via a rational structure through a social institution yet always as a basic tenet, securing individual autonomy and freedom of the Human Will through its various acts of decision making rather than a restricting status quo or an over-bearing disproportionate influence of a/any economic sector of interest as in the form of inappropriate forms of power leading to hindrances of all sorts both individually and even structurally as well.

References

Primary Sources

Fichte, System der Sittenlehre, Samtliche Werke, ed. I.H. Fichte, (Berlin: de Gruyter 1971)

Secondary Sources

Westphal, K. “Hegel’s Critic of Kant’s Moral View” in Philosophical Topics 19, No.2, 1991

*To the memory of my beloved father Öner Furtun